THE  H008AC  TUNNEL 


OUR  FINANCIAL  MAELSTROM. 


By  F.  W  .  BIRD. 


“  Beyond  the  lowest  depth ,  a  lower  deep.” 


BOSTON: 

WRIGHT  &  POTTER,  PRINTERS,  No.  4  SPRING  LANE. 

1  8  6  6. 


T  T  5  t-Sk 

c-A  x- 


THE  HOOSAC  TUNNEL. 


Before  discussing  the  management  and  condition  of  the 
Hoosac  Tunnel,  and  the  policy  and  duty  of  the  State,  we  present 
a  brief  historical  sketch  of  the  legislation  relating  to  the 
enterprise.  We  shall  see  how  it  commenced  as  an  ordinary  and 
harmless  railroad  corporation,  asking  only,  in  the  language  of 
the  petitioners  to  the  legislature  of  1848  in  aid  of  the  enterprise, 
“  for  the  privilege  of  building  their  own  road  with  their  own 
money next,  it  asked  a  loan  of  the  State  credit  for  two  millions 
of  dollars,  accompanying  the  petition  with  the  most  positive  and 
confident  assurances  that,  with  that  assistance,  the  friends  of 
the  work  could  and  would  furnish  abundant  means  to  complete 
it ;  and  asking  only  that  the  scrip  should  be  delivered  in  instal¬ 
ments,  as  the  work  progressed,  so  that  the  last  instalment 
should  not  be  delivered  till  the  work  was  finished  ;  next,  asking 
a  modification  of  those  conditions  more  favorable  to  the  projec¬ 
tors  ;  next,  asking  of  the  State,  with  other  favors,  as  advance  or 
gratuity  or  both,  some  four  hundred  thousand  dollars  ;  at  every 
successive  step  more  and  more  confident  that  with  the  help 
asked  at  that  time,  the  work  could  be  completed  ;  and  proving 
this  every  time  to  the  satisfaction  of  packed  committees,  and 
deceived  legislatures,  until  at  length  the  scheme  was  saddled 
upon  the  State  treasury,  with  less  than  one  one-tenth  of 
the  actual  work  done  at  a  cost  already  nearly  equal  to  the 
,  original  estimates  for  the  entire  work.  Let  these  facts  be 
borne  in  mind  that  we  may  know  what,  confidence  can  be 
Q  placed  in  the  statements  of  the  same  parties  as  to  the  condition, 
£  or  in  their  estimates  as  to  the  cost  of  the  completion  of  the 
^  work. 

The  Troy  and  Greenfield  Railroad  Company  was  chartered  in 
1848.  The  petitioners  asked  for  an  ordinary  charter,  simply 
for  the  privilege,  to  use  their  own  language,  of  “  building  their 


781305 


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own  road  with  their  own  money.”  The  majority  of  the  com¬ 
mittee  reported  adversely  ;  but  the  minority  reported  favorably, 
placing  the  claims  solely  on  the  ground  of  the  necessity  for 
additional  railroad  accommodations  for  the  western  part  of 
Franklin  County,  and  the  northern  part  of  Berkshire  County, 
and  that  the  people  of  that  section  of  the  State  were  entitled 
to  the  same  facilities  for  building  a  railroad  as  had  been  granted 
to  other  sections  of  the  State.  The  estimated  cost  was  $3,500,000, 
and  the  petitioners  proved  (!)  that  the  entire  road  from  Troy  to 
Greenfield  (exclusive  of  the  tunnel,)  would  be  built  in  eigh¬ 
teen  months,  and  the  tunnel  itself,  without  any  shafts,  in  fifteen 
hundred  and  fifty-six  days,  just  five  years.  Three  years  after, 
in  1851,  the  corporation  applied  to  the  legislature  for  a  loan  of 
the  State  credit  for  two  millions  of  dollars.  Instead  of  having 
road  and  tunnel  completed,  they  stated  at  that  time,  that 
“  three  hundred  thousand  dollars  have  been  subscribed  to  the 
capital  stock,  and  about  three  thousand  dollars  paid  in.  The 
work  of  construction  has  been  commenced  in  the  present 
month,  but  little  has  been  done — nothing  completed.”  The 
committee  reported  a  Bill  which  passed  the  Senate  but  was 
defeated  in  the  House. 

In  1853,  the  application  for  a  loan  was  renewed  ;  a  majority 
of  the  committee  reported  favorably.  The  Bill  passed  the 
House,  but  was  defeated  in  the  Senate.  The  amount  of  stock 
paid  in  at  this  time  was  $88,831. 

In  1854  the  application  was  renewed,  and  was  successful. 
The  Bill  was  based  upon  the  representation  of  the  petitioners 
that  the  whole  cost  was  to  be  between  three  and  a  half  and  four 
millions ;  the  State  was  to  furnish  the  two  millions  to  build 
the  tunnel,  estimated  by  their  engineer  to  cost  about  two 
millions,  and  the  corporation  was  to  furnish  the  balance  neces¬ 
sary  to  finish  the  road,  the  whole  to  be  mortgaged  to  the  State 
as  security  for  its  advances,  and  “  the  different  portions  of  the 
road  and  sections  of  the  tunnel  to  be  advanced  together.”  At 
this  time  the  amount  of  capital  stock  paid  in  was  ninety-four 
thousand  dollars.  Soon  after  the  passage  of  this  Act,  desperate 
appeals  were  made  for  subscriptions  to  the  capital  stock,  the 
result  of  which  appears  in  their  annual  report,  made  in  1856, 
giving  the  amount  of  capital  stock  paid  in  as  $121,412,  showing 


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an  addition  of  $27,412  to  the  amount  of  stock  paid  in  during 
two  years. 

In  1855  an  Act  was  passed  authorizing  certain  towns  on  the 
line  to  subscribe  three  per  cent,  on  their  valuation  respectively 
to  the  capital  stock.  If  all  the  towns  had  subscribed  the  full 
amount,  it  would  have  given  $259,283.  The  amount  actually 
paid  in  was  $125,000. 

In  1856  they  asked  the  legislature  to  subscribe  for  $150,000 
of  the  stock.  The  proposition  was  rejected  in  the  House  by  a 
vote  of  83  to  192. 

In  1857,  an  Act  modifying  the  provisions  of  the  Loan  Act 
passed  both  branches,  but  was  vetoed  by  Governor  Gardner, 
passed  in  the  House  over  the  veto,  but  failed  of  a  two-thirds 
vote  in  the  Senate.  This  year  the  parties  abandoned  the  idea 
of  a  local  road,  and  for  the  first  time  raised  the  cry  of  a  great 
commercial  road,  which  was  to  pour  the  wealth  of  the  West  into 
Massachusetts  and  Boston. 

In  1859  another  modification  of  the  Loan  Act  making  still 
further  concessions  to  the  corporation  was  passed,  but  during 
this  year  very  little  was  done. 

Up  to  this  time  the  legislature  had  adhered  firmly  to  the 
policy  of  the  original  Loan  Act,  which  was,  that  the  advances 
by  the  State  should  be  made  pari  passu  with  the  progress  of 
the  work,  requiring  bona  fide  subscriptions  to  the  amount  of 
$600,000,  with  other  conditions  furnishing  something  like 
security  that  the  work  should  be  completed  before  the  whole 
amount  of  the  loan  was  advanced. 

The  Act  of  1860  took  a  long  step  downwards.  It  released 
the  corporation  from  the  $600,000  subscription,  (up  to  this 
time  they  had  actually  raised  in  cash,  according  to  Mr.  Kim¬ 
ball’s  report, — House  Doc.  No.  185,  1860, — $66,058.28  !)  and 
made  other  concessions  to  the  corporation  ;  but  the  legislature 
still  adhered  to  conditions  which,  if  they  had  been  honestly 
interpreted,  would  have  secured  deliveries  of  the  scrip  in  pro¬ 
portion  to  the  work  done ,  and  the  delivery  of  the  last  scrip  only 
when  the  work  was  completed.  Unfortunately  for  the  State, 
the  governor  at  that  time,  and  the  State  engineers  appointed 
by  him,  adopted  the  constructions  put  upon  the  Act  by  the 
contractor,  (Herman  Ilaupt,)  the  result  of  which  would  have 
been  that  the  whole  amount  of  State  scrip  would  have  been 


6 


delivered  before  the  road  and  tunnel  were  half  completed .  In 
May,  1861,  William  S.  Whitwell  was  appointed  State  engineer, 
and  adopted  the  only  fair  and  honest  construction  of  the  Act. 
The  result  was,  that  in  the  summer  of  1861,  the  contractor 
abandoned  the  work. 

The  action  of  the  executive  council  of  that  year  shows, 
strikingly  and  sadly,  how  completely,  for  the  previous  three 
years,  the  tunnel  had  dominated  the  legislative  and  executive 
departments  of  the  State.  (See  Appendix  A.) 

Legislation  of  1862. 

We  come  now  to  the  most  extraordinary  of  the  acts  in  this 
wretched  drama.  Mr.  Haupt  could  not  go  on  under  Mr. 
WhitwelFs  construction  of  the  Act  of  1860,  and  the  corporation 
nominally,  Mr.  Haupt  really,  came  to  the  legislature  of  1862, 
asking  additional  favors.  As  usual,  a  committee  was  packed  in 
his  favor,  and  reported  all  he  asked.  Among  other  things,  they 
recommended  the  payment  of  $150,000  to  the  corporation, 
(Haupt  was  the  corporation,)  in  reality,  to  pay  Haupt’s  debts, 
on  account  of  alleged  injustice  done  to  him  in  the  construction 
put  by  Mr.  Whitwell  upon  the  Act  of  1860.  The  bill  was 
defeated.  Then  occurred  the  most  remarkable  trick  of  legisla¬ 
tive  legerdemain  ever  performed,  I  think  —  at  least,  in  this 
State. 

The  farce  of  a  hearing  had  been  played  before  the  committee 
on  this  subject.  A  few  gentlemen  appeared  before  the  com¬ 
mittee  for  the  purpose  of  aiding  in  investigating  the  condition 
and  character  of  the  enterprise.  It  was  very  soon  found  that 
the  conclusions  of  the  committee  were  already  foregone.  With 
perhaps  a  single  exception,  the  committee  was  completely  con¬ 
trolled  by  the  tunnel  interest,  or  rather  by  Mr.  Haupt.  Indeed, 
so  perfectly  did  he  dominate  the  committee  that,  at  first,  the 
chairman  habitually  refused  to  allow  us  to  open  any  matter 
without  his  consent.  The  result  was  what  we  expected — a 
unanimous  report,  giving  Mr.  Haupt  all  he  demanded.  Pre¬ 
cluded  from  any  expression  of  facts  through  a  minority  report, 
we  were  forced  to  make  our  appeal  to  the  legislature  through 
other  channels. 

The  report  of  the  committee  proceeded  upon  the  assumption 
that  Mr.  Haupt  had  been  wronged  by  Governor  Andrew  and 


7 


the  State  engineer,  and  their  whole  purpose  was  to  give  him 
redress.  Accordingly,  they  recommended  the  payment,  (nom¬ 
inally  to  the  corporation,  really  to  Haupt,)  of  $150,000  and 
an  advance  of  $195,000,  for  work  to  be  done,  and,  also,  the 
payment  to  him  of  all  sums  he  should  expend  for  machinery, 
Ac.,  (including  pneumatic  drills,  <fcc.,  &c. !)  The  bill  was 
reported  on  the  24th  of  March.  Various  substitutes,  amend¬ 
ments,  &c.,  were  proposed.  Among  these  was  one  offered 
by  Mr.  Swan,  of  Norfolk,  proposing  the  appointment  of  com¬ 
missioners  to  investigate  the  whole  matter  of  the  tunnel,  and 
report  to  the  next  legislature.  Another  section  required  the 
attorney-general  to  take  possession  of  the  railroad  under 
the  mortgages  to  the  State.  Another  authorized  the  governor 
and  council  to  finish  the  railroad  from  Greenfield  to  the  moun¬ 
tain.  The  latter  provision  was  considered  of  no  practical 
importance  as,  first,  it  was  not  considered  possible  that  the  gov¬ 
ernor  and  council  could  do  so  foolish  a  thing  as  authorize  the 
building  of  a  railroad  into  a  cul-de-sac ,  with  no  prospect  of  its 
being  wanted  for  a  through  line  for  ten  years  ;  and  second,  the 
rails  were  all  bought  and  paid  for,  the  road  was  said  to  be  very 
nearly  finished,  and  such  glowing  accounts  had  been  given  of 
the  local  business,  that  it  was  supposed  that  the  traffic  would 
partially,  perhaps  wholly,  pay  the  interest  on  the  trifling  addi¬ 
tional  cost  of  completing  the  road.  How  we  were  humbugged 
in  this  matter,  as  well  as  in  all  others,  the  sequel  will  show. 

After  a  protracted  fight,  in  which  all  the  log-rolling  tactics, 
so  long  successful,  were  brought  into  action,  and  after  full  dis¬ 
cussion,  on  the  21st  of  April,  Mr.  Swan’s  substitute  was 
adopted  by  a  vote  of  18  to  17.  This  result  was  regarded  by 
the  plunderers  as  a  Waterloo  defeat, — for  all  was  lost,  even 
honor. 

The  next  morning,  an  act  of  inexplicable  stupidity,  or  tim¬ 
idity,  robbed  us  of  all  the  fruits  of  the  hard-won  victory.  Mr. 
Plunkett,  of  Pittsfield,  moved  to  recommit  the  bill  to  a  special 
committee  of  the  Senate  !  We  had  the  winning  cards  in  our 
hands.  Several  senators,  who  had  voted  against  Mr.  Swan’s 
bill  under  pledges  the  day  before,  would  thenceforth,  it  was 
well  known,  support  this  bill.  But — under  what  influences  I 
know  not — perhaps  when  the  secrets  of  the  club-room  at  the 


8 


United  States  hotel  are  revealed,  we  shall  know — the  fatal 
motion  was  made.  We  protested — but  it  was  too  late. 

No,  it  was  not  entirely  too  late.  By  long-settled  parliament¬ 
ary  rule,  the  bill  was  entitled  to  have  a  majority  of  its  friends 
on  the  committee.  Through  an  excess  of  courtesy,  which 
aimed  to  represent  all  parties  on  the  committee,  the  President 
of  the  Senate  placed  on  the  committee  two  friends  of  the  bill — 
Messrs.  Plunkett,  (his  motion  made  him  at  least  a  doubtful 
friend,)  and  Swan ;  two  opponents,  Messrs.  Crocker  and  Rich¬ 
ardson  ;  and,  for  the  fifth,  Mr.  Williams,  of  Worcester.  This 
gentleman  had  introduced  a  substitute,  which  was  ostensibly 
opposed  by  the  tunnelites  proper,  as  strenuously  as  Mr.  Swan’s 
bill,  and  he  was  supposed  to  occupy  a  position  of  neutrality. 
We  had  not  learned  then,  what  we  afterwards  discovered  to 
our  sorrow,  that  there  was  no  more  unconditional  tunnel  man 
in  the  Senate  than  he.* 

In  the  afternoon  of  the  same  day,  the  committee  reported  a 
new  bill,  substantially  as  it  finally  passed.  The  two  tunnel 
men,  Messrs.  Crocker  and  Richardson,  refused  to  join  in  the 
report !  It  was  afterwards  found  that  they  had  got  more  than 
they  had  dreamed  of  asking.  The  most  important  change  in. 
the  bill  as  originally  reported  was,  that  no  portion  of  the  road 
should  be  constructed  “  without  the  approval  of  the  governor 
and  council.”  This  restriction  was  in  Mr.  Swan’s  bill,  but  was 
not  in  Mr.  Williams’  substitute,  nor  in  the  bill  reported  by  the 
special  committee,  but  was  afterwards  inserted.  This  amend¬ 
ment  prevented  the  supreme  folly  of  building  the  road  on  the 
contractor’s  wretched  location,  as  Mr.  Brooks  would  have  done 
without  this  restriction,  and  thus  saved  the  State  a  million  or 
so  of  dollars,  and  the  discredit  of  building  a  road  entirely 
unfitted  for  a  great  traffic,  and  which  would  ultimately  have 
been  abandoned. 

The  Bill  passed  to  be  engrossed  in  the  Senate  on  the  23d, 

*  We  did  not  then  know  of  the  existence  of  a  disturbing  element  in  the 
shape  of  that  phantom  railroad  corporation,  the  Worcester,  Barre,  and  Gard¬ 
ner  Railroad,  the  design  of  which  is  to  tap  the  Vermont  and  Massachusetts 
Railroad  at  Gardner,  and  bring  all  the  tunnel  traffic  through  Worcester  to  the 
Boston  and  Worcester  railroad.  Atrocious  as  is  the  bad  faith  of  this  scheme 
towards  Fitchburg  and  the  Fitchburg  Railroad,  it  answered  its  purpose  ;  and, 
without  alienating  the  allies  it  was  designed  to  cheat,  it  brought  to  the  aid  of 
the  tunnel  a  reserve  which  alone  turned  the  tide  of  battle  against  us. 


9 


( nem .  dis .),  was  taken  up  in  the  House  on  the  24th,  and  after 
a  very  brief  discussion,  and  the  adoption  of  amendments,  was 
passed  and  sent  back  to  the  Senate.  On  the  25th  the  House 
amendments  were  concurred  in,  the  tunnel  men  voting  solid 
against  them,  including  all  the  leaders,  Messrs.  Crocker,  Gris¬ 
wold,  Richardson,  Smith,  Stevens,  and  Williams. 

Up  to  this  time,  the  substantial  victory  was  with  us.  1st. 
We  had  taken  steps  to  rescue  the  enterprise  from  the  utterly 
bankrupt  and  powerless  corporation  which  had  ceased  to 
exist.  2d.  We  had  defeated  the  attempt  to  swindle  the  State 
out  of  three  or  four  hundred  thousand  dollars,  and  had  ousted 
Mr.  Haupt  from  all  connection  with  the  enterprise.  3d.  We 
had  secured  the  appointment  of  commissioners  by  Governor 
Andrew ,  (the  Act  required  that  they  should  be  “  able,  impar¬ 
tial ,  and  skilful,”)  to  make  a  thorough  investigation  of  the 
whole  matter ;  and  though  the  Act  did  not  require  that 
they  should  report  “  to  the  next  legislature,”  we  knew  full  well 
that  such  a  commission  could  not  report  before  another  legisla¬ 
ture  should  meet.  4th.  Although  the  Act  nominally  seemed  to 
contemplate  the  prosecution  of  the  work  on  the  road  and  tunnel 
by  the  State,  yet  it  made  such  prosecution  subject,  in  both  cases, 
“  to  the  approval  of  the  governor  and  council ;  ”  and  as  it  was 
well  known  that  for  the  last  eleven  months  Governor  Andrew 
had  been  the  object  of  the  bitterest  and  most  unsparing  hostility 
from  the  tunnelites  proper,  and  as  the  universal  impression 
entertained  by  his  most  intimate  friends,  was  that  he  was 
opposed  to  the  tunnel,  the  argument  addressed  to  the  opponents 
of  the  tunnel  “  Are  you  afraid  to  trust  this  matter  with  Gover¬ 
nor  Andrew  ?  ”  was  unanswerable.  5th.  Although  the  Act  con¬ 
tained  provisions  for  the  payment  of  certain  claims  which  it  was 
well  known,  were  intended  to  cover  Mr.  Haupt’s  debts,  yet  it 
expressly  limited  the  payment  to  “  just  claims  ;  ”  and  as  we  did 
not  for  a  moment  dream  that  this  would  be  interpreted  to  mean 
anything  but  “just  claims”  against  the  State,  and  as  this  too 
was  under  the  control  of  the  governor  and  council,  it  was  con¬ 
sidered  an  entirely  harmless  provision.  Under  these  considera¬ 
tions,  though  the  Act  was  not  all  we  aimed  at,  we  accepted  it,  as 
did  the  tunnel  men ,  as  a  substantial  defeat  of  the  scheme.  Had 
it  been  supposed  at  the  time  that  the  result  would  be,  the  adop¬ 
tion  and  prosecution  of  the  tunnel  as  a  State  work,  not  one- 
2 


10 


third  of  either  House  would  have  dared  to  go  before  their 
constituents  on  a  vote  in  its  favor. 

The  key  to  the  whole  problem  was  now  in  the  hands  of  the 
governor  and  council.  The  Act  required  the  commissioners  to 
“  report  to  the  governor  and  council  what,  in  their  judgment, 
will  be  the  most  economical,  practical,  and  advantageous 
method  of  completing  said  road  and  tunnel,  the  estimated  cost 
of  fitting  the  same  for  use,  the  time  within  which  the  tunnel 
can  be  completed,  and  what  contracts  can  be  effected,  and  with 
what  parties,  for  completing  said  tunnel  and  road,  and  the 
probable  cost  of  the  same ,  the  probable  pecuniary  value  of  the 
road  and  tunnel  when  completed ,  the  sources  and  amount  of 
traffic  and  income ,  and  all  other  facts,  <fcc.,  &c.”  We  felt  per¬ 
fectly  confident  that  if  we  could  secure  a  report  faithfully 
fulfilling  those  requirements,  especially  the  clauses  which  we 
have  italicized,  no  sane  man  could  ever  recommend  the  prose¬ 
cution  of  the  work  by  the  State.  We  thought  we  should  get 
such  a  report.  We  shall  see. 

More  than  all  their  accustomed  audacity,  persistency,  and 
adroitness  was  thenceforth  devoted  by  the  tunnelites  to  procur¬ 
ing  the  right  kind  of  commission.  Of  the  influences  which  led 
to  the  selection  of  the  gentlemen  who  composed  the  commis¬ 
sion,  we  do  not  propose  to  speak,  except  to  express  our 
undoubting  confidence  that  Governor  Andrew  intended  to 
secure,  and  thought  he  had  secured  the  services  of  “  three 
able,  impartial  and  skilful  commissioners.” 

Change  of  Front. 

Let  us  pause  for  a  moment  to  consider  the  extraordinary 
character  of  this  transaction.  The  whole  purpose  of  the  hear¬ 
ing  before  the  committee  had  been  to  show  that  Mr.  Haupt  had 
been  aggrieved,  and  the  whole  object  of  the  committee’s  bill  was 
to  remunerate  him  for  losses  sustained  by  the  action  of  the 
executive.  Defeated  in  this,  and  reinforced  at  the  critical 
moment  by  unexpected  allies,  the  whole  line  changed  front, 
deserted  their  leader,  General  Haupt,  sneaked  into  the  enemy’s 
camp  and  laid  down  their  arms;  and,  after  the  smoke  cleared 
away,  it  was  found  that  they  had  seized  our  guns  and  turned 
them  upon  us,  taken  possession  of  our  treasure-chest,  and  added 
to  their  audacity  the  impudence  of  asserting  that  all  this  was 


11 


stipulated  in  the  terms  of  their  surrender!  The  annals  of 
legislative  history  will  be  searched  in  vain  for  a  parallel. 

We  were  outwitted.  There  is  always  a  sort  of  credit 
attached  to  success,  however  won  ;  but  nothing  can  justify  or 
extenuate  the  treachery  which  attended  this  transaction.  Mr. 
Haupt  was  basely  and  shamelessly,  even  exultingly  and  remorse¬ 
lessly  betrayed.  Whatever  may  have  been  our  opinions  of  his 
conduct,  they,  upon  their  own  showing,  were  bound  by  every 
consideration  of  interest,  of  gratitude  and  of  honor,  to  stand 
by  him  to  the  bitter  end.  He  had  shouldered  the  enterprise, 
and  for  three  years  had  been  corporation,  board  of  directors, 
engineer,  contractor — everything.  They  had  uniformly  avowed 
that,  with  the  bare  payment  of  the  sums  justly  due  to  him, 
he  could  and  would  complete  the  work.  But  the  very  moment 
the  prospect  opened  of  saving  themselves  by  sacrificing  him, 
they  turned  their  backs  upon  him  as  shamelessly  as  ever  a 
gang  of  burglars  abandoned  a  stool-pigeon  who  could  no  longer 
serve  them.  The  old  adage — honor  among  thieves — was  for¬ 
gotten.  Well  might  Mr.  Haupt  exclaim  in  the  language  of 
Woolsey  (slightly  altered,) 

“  Had  I  but  served  the  State  with  half  the  zeal 
I  served  ray  friends,  she  would  not,  in  my  need, 

Have  left  me  naked  to  mine  enemies.” 

We  had  hoped  that  when  the  rogues  fell  out,  honest  men 
would  get  their  dues.  The  sequel  proved  that  we  were 
mistaken. 


The  Commissioners. 

We  have  now  reached  a  new  stage.  The  commissioners 
appointed  under  the  Act  were  John  W.  Brooks,  Samuel  M. 
Felton,  and  Alexander  Holmes.  Mr.  Brooks  was  unknown  out¬ 
side  of  a  very  narrow  circle  in  Boston.  He  had  been  brought 
into  notice  by  a  master,  a  much  abler  man  than  himself,  John 
M.  Forbes,  Esq.,  to  whom  he  had  made  himself  eminently  ser¬ 
viceable  in  certain  extensive  railroad  operations  at  the  West. 
Arrogant,  insolent,  and  domineering  towards  those  whom  he 
considered  his  inferiors,  or  over  whom  circumstances  gave  him 
the  advantage ;  plausible,  deferential  and  obsequious  towards 
those  whom  he  could  not  browbeat  or  cajole  ;  incapable,  from 


12 


early  training  and  pursuits,  of  liberal  and  comprehensive  poli¬ 
cies  ;  made  by  his  master,  president  and  director  in  several  impor¬ 
tant  railroads  at  the  West,  but  in  no  respect  identified  with 
Massachusetts  interests,  he  entered  upon  this  work,  (even  cred¬ 
iting  him  with  good  intentions  up  to  his  capacities,)  under  the 
natural  bias  of  Western  interests,  with  the  aim  of  benefiting 
those  interests,  by  opening  another  avenue  for  his  Western  traffic 
to  Boston.  Had  he  been  generally  and  well  known  in  Massa¬ 
chusetts,  I  venture  the  assertion  that  he  could  never  have  been 
placed  at  the  head  of  a  commission  requiring  the  highest  quali¬ 
ties  of  “able,  impartial,  and  skilful  men.”  In  his  case  the  old 
proverb,  “  like  master,  like  man,”  failed.  His  character  is  well 
described  in  the  saying  of  a  courtier  of  Louis  XIY. : — 


II  eut  cent  vertus  de  valetf 
Et  pas  une  de  maitre. 


We  needed  a  master ;  we  got  a  lackey.  And  yet,  as  we  shall 
see,  he  assumed  the  airs  of  a  master,  well  illustrating  a  striking 
remark  made  by  the  elder  Dana  in  a  lecture  many  years  ago, — 
“  What  more  unsparing  tyrant  than  a  despot  ?  Always,  always 
that  despot’s  slave !  ” 

Mr.  Felton  was  at  that  time  president  of  the  Philadelphia, 
Wilmington  &  Baltimore  Railroad  ;  a  gentleman  of  experience, 
ability,  and  character.  But,  residing  at  such  a  distance,  it  was 
impossible  that  he  should  give  that  attention  to  this  work  which, 
especially  with  such  a  chairman,  its  importance  demanded. 
Indeed,  his  labors,  increased  many  fold  by  the  exigencies  of  the 
war,  broke  down  his  health,  so  that  he  was  obliged  to  resign 
both  the  presidency  of  that  road,  and  his  place  on  this  commis¬ 
sion.  Mr.  Felton,  too,  was  a  tunnel  man  from  the  start.  For 
many  years  before  he  went  to  Baltimore,  he  was  superintendent 
of  the  Fitchburg  Railroad,  and  of  course,  as  was  well  known  at 
the  time  of  his  appointment,  all  his  sympathies  and  preposses¬ 
sions  were  with  the  tunnel.  Mr.  Holmes  had  been  long  and 
favorably  known  as  a  railroad  manager  of  large  experience,  of 
great  capacity,  independence  and  integrity  ;  but  he  too  was  so 
engrossed  with  the  large  and  extending  enterprises  entrusted  to 
his  direction  that  he  has  been  able  to  give  but  the  slightest 
personal  supervision  to  this  work. 


13 


It  thus  appears  that  two  of  the  commissioners  were  so  fully 
committed,  by  interests  and  sympathies,  to  the  Tunnel,  that 
but  one  conclusion  could  be  expected.  It  also  appears  that  an 
unfortunate  combination  of  circumstances  in  the  relations  of  two 
of  the  commissioners  to  other  enterprises,  which  properly  had 
the  first  demands  upon  them,  practically  left  the  whole  con¬ 
trol  of  the  commission  with  Mr  Brooks.  We  have  given  more 
space  to  these  details  than  would  seem  to  be  necessary ;  but 
without  them,  the  partisan  character  of  Mr.  Brooks’  first  report, 
and  the  discreditable  mismanagement  of  the  work,  would  be 
utterly  inexplicable. 

Mr.  Brooks’  First  Report. 

We  shall  not  attempt  a  minute  exposure  of  the  shallowness 
and  the  inconsequential  conclusions  of  this  “  big  pamphlet.  ”  It 
would  require  a  volume.  We  content  ourselves,  for  the  present, 
with  this  general  statement,  which  a  careful  examination  of  this 
report  and  of  their  subsequent  reports,  together  with  the  devel¬ 
opments  of  nearly  three  years  of  work  will  fully  warrant,  that 
the  cost  of  the  work  will  immeasurably  exceed  their  estimates, 
the  time  of  completion  will  be  extended  many  years,  and  the 
estimates  of  traffic,  which  are  mainly  based  upon  trumpery  tables 
of  Western  business  and  of  the  traffic  on  other  roads  without  the 
slightest  proof  that  the  opening  of  the  tunnel  will  considerably 
increase  the  amount  of  this  traffic  to  Boston,  are  utterly  falla¬ 
cious  and  delusive.  We  shall  refer  to  some  of  these  topics  again. 
For  the  present,  we  copy  some  extracts  from  the  very  able  arti¬ 
cles  of  “Civil  Engineer”  in  the  Boston  “  Daily  Advertiser.” 
These  articles  are  the  more  valuable  as  coming  from  a  gentleman 
recently  from  another  state,  without  interest  or  prejudice  in  the 
premises,  but  who  wrote  solely  as  an  engineer  and  an  unbiassed 
expert.  Referring  to  the  commissioners’  report  and  to  those  of 
the  engineers  accompanying  it,  he  says : — 

I  must  repeat  that  I  have  looked  in  vain  through  these  reports  for  the 
reasons  that  prompted  the  State  of  Massachusetts  to  embark  in  this  stu¬ 
pendous  folly,  for  I  find  only  reasons  why  it  should  not  be  undertaken. 
Their  engineer  tells  us,  p.  210,  that  “  New  York  city  possesses  advantages 
for  exporting  breadstuffs  that  no  railroad  can  neutralize”  That  not  only 
are  her  facilities  for  transportation  by  canal  and  river  such  that  “  no 


14 


railroad  can  compete  with  them,  ”  but  “  her  railroad  connections  with 
the  West  are  also  shorter,  ”  the  difference  being  “  from  50  to  75  miles 
in  favor  of  New  York ;  ”  and  that,  though  Boston  is  200  miles  nearer 
Liverpool,  New  York  has  the  greater  advantage  for  obtaining  return 
freights.  He  thinks  that  the  failure,  for  the  twelve  years  that  the  pro¬ 
ject  was  before  the  public,  to  raise  the  necessary  means  for  its  con¬ 
struction  is  “  evidence  of  the  want  of  commercial  value  in  the  project,  ” 
p.  212,  and  yet  he  considers  “  the  question  of  its  commercial  value”  and 
the  “  benefits  to  the  State  the  ruling  or  main  consideration  which  should 
determine  the  advisability  of  its  construction,”  p.  213.  This  is  good 
reasoning,  and  the  conclusion  is  logically  inevitable  that  as  the  main 
consideration  is  wanting,  its  construction  is  not  advisable.  If  it  is  not  a 
good  financial  investment,  and  has  no  commercial  value,  why  persist 
longer  in  such  an  extravagant,  wastful  and  wanton  delusion  ?  But  look 
further,  and  and  on  page  122  we  find  Mr.  Storrow’s  opinion  very  faintly 
disguised  in  the  concluding  sentences  of  his  report.  After  alluding  to 
the  uncertain  and  unsatisfactory  nature  of  all  estimates  of  this  kind,  and 
to  the  many  contingencies  which  experience  has  shown  go  to  swell  the 
cost,  he  says,  “  If  the  advantages  to  be  derived  from  the  tunnel  are  not 
an  equivalent  for  an  expenditure  of  $3,000,000  thereon,  exclusive  of 
interest,  it  is  not  worth  while  to  pursue  the  undertaking  ;  ”  and  then, 
with  great  tact,  he  adds,  “  Whether  the  very  great  advntages  anticipated 
from  the  opening  of  this  new  avenue  to  the  great  West,  with  diminished 
distance  and  diminished  grades,”  (!)  &c*,  “  are  sufficient  to  warrant  the 
construction  of  this  work,  at  such  an  expenditure  of  time  and  money,  is  a 
matter  which  it  is  not  for  me  to  discuss,  but  remains  for  the  considera¬ 
tions  of  the  commissioners.” 

Look  again,  and  on  p.  138,  what  does  Mr.  Latrobe  say  ?  “  It  is 

manifest  that  if,  even  in  the  somewhat  distant  future,  may  be  discerned 
a  prospect  of  public  benefit,  &c.  ”  Is  it  possible  for  words  to  express 
more  delicately  the  doubts  which,  in  spite  of  himself,  shook  his  faith  in 
the  policy  and  expediency  of  the  project  ?  But  he  adds,  “  if  the  enter¬ 
prise  really  possesses  the  merits  claimed  for  it,  (which  I  cannot  doubt,) 
half  a  million,  more  or  less,  should  not  stay  its  progress.  ” 

So  far  we  have  found  little  encouragement  and  no  arguments  in  favor 
of  the  adopted  policy.  But  we  shall  certainly  find  in  the  report  of  the 
commissioners,  reasons  so  cogent  and  conclusive  as  to  override  all  these 
doubts,  and  force  conviction  upon  every  mind.  For  in  so  important  an 
undertaking  as  this  there  should  be  most  satisfactory  and  conclusive 
evidence  adduced  of  its  vital  necessity,  and  of  the  great  superiority  of 
this  new  route,  before  involving  the  State  in  such  an  enormous  expen¬ 
diture. 


15 


We  begin  the  search,  and  find  first,  that  they  commend  Mr.  Storrow’s 
“  interesting  and  instructive  report  to  the  most  careful  and  attentive 
perusal.  ”  We  peruse  it,  and  learn  all  about  European  tunnels,  but  he 
declines  to  give  any  opinion  about  the  Hoosac  Tunnel.  They  tells  us 
that  “  Mr.  Latrobe’s  authority  is  quite  as  good  as  that  of  any  other 
engineer,  and  that  his  report  will  repay  a  careful  reading.”  We  read  it 
carefully,  and  learn  from  him  how  a  tunnel  ought  to  be  built,  but  see  no 
reasons  advanced  for  building  the  Hoosac  Tunnel.  They  tell  us  that 
Mr.  Laurie’s  “  valuable  discussion  of  the  subject  will  be  found  in  his 
General  Report.  ”  As  Mr.  Storrow  had  said,  “  it  is  not  for  me  to  dis¬ 
cuss  it,  ”  we  suppose  it  was  left  for  Mr.  Laurie.  And  so  we  wade 
through  Mr.  Laurie’s  87  closely  printed  octavo  pages,  and  find  that  the 
scheme  has  labored  through  12  long  years  without  finding  anybody  to 
appreciate  it, — that  it  will  cost  a  great  deal  of  money, — that  the  route 
has  such  and  such  grades,  and  a  great  deal  of  unsafe  curvature, — that  if 
built  it  will  divide  the  business  with  the  Western  Railroad,  to  which  as 
a  passenger  road  it  is  inferior, — that  Boston  cannot  compete  with  New 
York  city  in  the  exportation  of  breadstuff's, — that  he  sees  evidences  of 
the  want  of  commercial  value  in  the  project, — but  that  he  has  “  neither 
data,  time  nor  ability  to  go  fully  into  these  subjects,  ” — and  so  ends  his 
valuable  discussion  of  the  subject. 

Well,  we  return  to  the  report  of  the  commissioners,  which  from  the 
beginning  has  read  as  though  written  on  the  assumption,  the  foregone 
conclusion,  that  the  tunnel  shall  be  built  at  all  hazards,  and  we  read  all 
their  speculations  about  how  the  tunnel  should  be  worked,  with  wdiat 
faces  and  headings,  how  long  it  will  take  to  build  it,  “  that  great  waste 
is  the  inevitable  result  of  works  constructed  by  States,  ”  that  this  route 
will  help  build  up  Manchester  and  Portsmouth,  N.  H.,  and  Portland, 
away  down  in  Maine,  that  the  Boston  and  Albany  is  the  best  freight 
line  between  Boston  and  the  West,  and  that  the  tunnel  route  is  about 
as  good  !  but  that  there  is  “  a  margin  in  favor  of  New  York  ”  over  either ; 
that,  a\vare  the  thing  would  not  pay  as  an  investment,  they  have  made 
a  contract  with  the  Fitchburg  and  other  roads  to  help  the  State  out  by 
throwing  in  one-fifth  of  their  hard  earnings,  (as  though  it  did  not 
come  out  of  the  people  after  all ;)  that  the  town  of  North  Adams  would 
“  furnish  the  line  considerable  business and,  finally,  that,  “  considering 
the  large  sum  which  the  Commonwealth  has  already  invested  in  this 
work,  which  would  be  lost  if  it  is  not  completed,”  &c.,  “  the  work  should 
be  undertaken  and  completed  by  the  Commonwealth.”  Oh  !  most  lame 
and  impotent  conclusion ! 

This  is  a  brief  but  fair  and  honest  synopsis  of  the  whole  subject,  as  set 
forth  in  that  great  report  of  February,  1863,  when  the  legislature, 
after  a  show  of  thorough  investigation,  deliberately  determined  to  put 


16 


this  thing  through,  and  the  governor  deliberately  sanctioned  it.  (I  hope 
I  may  not  be  charged  with  disrespect  in  calling  it  a  “  thing.  ”  It  is  not 
a  tunnel,  nor  is  it  likely  to  be,  nor  a  road,  nor  a  line.  It  has  been 
called  an  enterprise,  a  project,  an  undertaking,  a  scheme,  a  work,  a  new 
avenue,  a  feature,  a  route,  for,  like  certain  other  rough  subjects,  it  has 
many  aliases ,  and  perhaps  one  is  as  good  as  another.)  It  is  true  an 
attempt  is  made  to  prove  that  there  is  business  enough  to  justify  its 
prosecution,  by  showing  that  the  total  amount  received  for  freight  between 
Boston  and  Albany  during  the  last  twenty  years  was  $7,636,206, 
(an  amount  but  little  more  than  half  the  receipts  on  the  Pennsylvania 
Railroad  alone  the  last  year,)  but  that  this  business  will  probably  be 
largely  increased,  and  that  “  it  would  seem  as  if  the  increased  facilities 
offered  by  the  tunnel  line,  ”  which  we  have  failed  to  discover,  “  should 
put  it  in  the  power  of  the  Boston  merchants  to  build  up  a  large  and 
profitable  trade  from  this  source.  ”  (Page  88.)  First  build  the  tunnel, 
and  then  build  up  the  trade  !  Truly  the  present  generation  of  Boston 
merchants  have  a  glorious  prospect  in  store  for  their  successors.  A 
legacy  of  debt  and  taxation,  and  the  privilege  of  building  up  a  trade  by 
means  of  a  line  connecting  them  with  the  West  in  every  respect  inferior 
to  the  one  already  constructed. 

It  will  not  by  pretended  that  the  Western  road  is  worked  up  to  its  full 
capacity,  in  the  face  of  the  statement  on  page  99  that  the  through  ton¬ 
nage  on  the  New  York  Central  Railroad  for  the  year  1862  amounted  to 
770,190  tons,  while  upon  the  Western  road,  for  the  five  years  preceding, 
it  amounted  only  to  672,737  tons,  an  average  of  134,547  tons  a  year,  or 
about  one-sixth  of  that  upon  the  New  York  Central.  It  is  difficult  to 
belive  that  intelligent  men  can  be  sincere  in  a  proposition  to  expend  so 
many  millions  of  dollars  to  construct  another  line  to  divide  this  compara¬ 
tively  trifling  business  with  the  Western  road. 

No  one  questions  the  possibility  of  tunnelling  the  Hoosac  Mountain. 
Mr.  Storrow  says,  page  117:  “As  regards  the  feasibility  of  completing 
such  a  work,  I  entertain  no  doubt  whatever.  ”  Mr.  Latrobe  says,  page 
126,  “  that  any  work,  of  whatever  magnitude,  must  be  pronounced  practic¬ 
able,  if  the  means  for  its  accomplishment  are  within  the  reach  of  human 
power.  ”  Mr.  Laurie  says,  p.  213,  “  the  tunnel  is  perfectly  practicable  ;  ” 
and  the  joint  special  committee  of  the  legislature  in  their  report  of  Feb. 
1865,  p.  37,  say  “that  do  doubt  remains  in  the  minds  of  any  as  to  the 
entire  feasibility  of  the  scheme.  ”  And  because  it  is  practicable,  for¬ 
sooth,  it  is  therefore  expedient!  No  matter  what  it  cost,  no  matter 
whether  it  will  be  of  any  economical  or  commercial  value  when  finished, 
because  everybody  says  it  is  possible  to  do  it,  it  must  be  done.  Plenty 
of  time  and  plenty  of  money,  and  surely  the  great  State  of  Massachu- 


17 


setts  lias  both,  is  all  that  is  necessary.  '  We  must  not  investigate  too 
closely  the  expediency,  nor  question  the  policy  recommended  by  the 
commissioners,  of  the  Commonwealth’s  undertaking  and  carrying  on  to 
completion  this  Quixotic  scheme.  The  legislative  committee  quoted 
above,  say,  p.  37,  “  It  is  not  within  their  province  to  discuss  the  merits 
of  the  tunnel  enterprise,”  and  so  say  all  the  engineers.  Everybody  seems 
afraid  to  discuss  its  merits  but  one  man. 

And  here  I  may  be  allowed  to  say  that  I  not  the  slightest  acquaintance 
with  that  gentleman,  even  by  sight,  and  the  same  remarks  will  apply  to 
the  commissioners.  If  I  have  any  prejudice  or  bias,  it  is  that  which  every 
engineer  must  feel  professionally,  a  desire  to  see  so  great  and  scientifi¬ 
cally  interesting  a  work  carried  successfully  through.  But  I  cannot,  on 
the  grounds  of  political  or  domestic  economy,  nor  as  a  financial  operation, 
nor  as  a  valuable  commercial  enterprise,  see  any  reason  for  its  further  pro¬ 
secution.  I  admit  that  the  State  of  Massachusetts  and  the  city  of  Boston 
should  not  shrink  from  any  enterprise  that  will  materially  shorten  the 
distance  or  increase  the  facilities  of  transportation  to  the  great  West,  but 
I  deny  most  emphatically  that  it  has  been  shown  that  the  Boston  and 
Troy  route  by  the  Hoosac  Tunnel  does  accomplish  these  results,  and 
insist  that  a  wise  and  sensible  policy  dictates  the  immediate  abandon-, 
ment  of  this,  the  greatest  folly  of  the  age.  If  we  would  participate 
more  fully  in  the  great  and  increasing  trade  of  the  West,  we  must  look 
in  some  other  direction,  or  find  out  some  other  route  which  will  unques¬ 
tionably  secure  to  us  the  facilities  and  advantages  which  the  tunnel  route 
utterly  fails  to  afford. 

We  remark,  in  passing,  that  the  language  of  this  report,  the 
acts  of  the  commissioners,  and  the  phraseology  of  the  Act 
of  1863,  all  agree  in  refuting  the  claim  set  up  by  the 
tunnelites  that  the  Act  of  1862  was  intended  to  authorize  or, 
fairly  interpreted,  did  authorize  the  resumption  of  work  on  the 
tunnel  by  the  State.  The  commissioners  say,  “  We  are  of 
opinion  that  the  work  should  be  undertaken  by  the  State.” 
They  would  hardly  recommend  that  to  be  done  which  the  State 
had  already  determined  to  do.  Until  action  by  the  legislature- 
of  1863,  they  had  not  struck  a  blow  or  spent  a  dollar  on  the 
work,  but  referred  the  matter  to  the  legislature.  The  gover¬ 
nor,  in  his  message  transmitting  their  report  to  the  legislature, 
endorsed  this  reference.  The  legislature  in  the  first  section  of 
the  Act,  chap.  214,  of  1863,  declared,  “  The  commissioners 
are  hereby  authorized,  subject  to  the  advice  and  approval  of  the 
3 


18 


governor  and  council,  to  construct,  &c.,  &c.”  It  was  alone  tlie 
recommendation  of  the  commissioners  that  the  work  should  be 
undertaken  by  the  State,  that  revived  the  dead  enterprise  and 
led  the  legislature  to  authorize  the  resumption  of  the  work. 

In  the  order  of  history,  we  come  to  the  system  adopted  in  the 
disbursement  of  the  money  of  the  State.  Early  in  the  year 
1863  it  was  thought  desirable  by  the  executive  department,  to 
establish  a  plan  for  accountability  and  economy  in  the  disburse¬ 
ments  and  expenditures  of  the  large  amounts  which  would  be 
required.  Bills  were  coming  in,  and  larger  were  expected. 
Accordingly  a  plan  was  embodied  in  the  following  Order : — 

COMMONWEALTH  OF  MASSACHUSETTS. 

Executive  Department,  Council  Chamber,  I 
Boston,  February  2,  1863.  \ 

Questions  having  arisen  as  to  the  practical  administration  of  that  part 
of  the  existing  statute  concerning  the  Troy  and  Greenfield  Railroad, 
appropriating  money,  in  reference  to  the  proper  method  of  auditing 
accounts  and  claims  payable  thereunder,  it  is  therefore, 

Ordered,  By  the  Governor,  with  the  advice  and  consent  of  the  Council. 
That  all  bills  for  expenses  incurred,  for  service  rendered,  or  for  awards  and 
allowances  made,  by  direction  of  the  Commissioners  on  the  Troy  and 
Greenfield  Railroad,  under  authority  of  chap.  156  of  the  Acts  of  1862, 
shall  be  accompanied  by  satisfactory  vouchers,  and  shall  be  required  to 
specify  dates  and  amount  of  expense,  time  of  service  and  rate  of  compen¬ 
sation,  and  all  other  details  necessary  to  a  full  and  proper  understanding 
and  adjustment  of  the  claims  which  they  represent.  And  it  is  further 
ordered,  that  all  bills  and  and  claims  accruing  under  authority  of  said 
Act,  shall  be  first  examined  and  approved  by  not  less  than  two  of  the 
Commissioners  aforesaid,  except,  when  this  is  inconvenient  or  impracti¬ 
cable,  the  approval  of  the  chairman  of  the  Commissioners  shall  suffice 
for  accounts  not  exceeding  fifty  dollars  respectively,  and  that  said  Com¬ 
missioners  shall  certify  in  their  approval  that  the  charges  and  allowances 
are  just  and  reasonable. 

The  accounts  when  thus  rendered  to  the  Governor,  and  by  him  sub¬ 
mitted  to  the  Council  Committee  of  Accounts  for  examination,  shall,  if 
found  correct  by  them,  be  returued  to  the  Governor,  who  will  transmit 
the  same  to  the  Auditor  of  Accounts,  and  if  found  by  him  to  be  in  con¬ 
formity  with  the  statutes  of  the  Commonwealth  and  with  this  Order,  he 
will  certify  the  same  for  allowance.  The  Secretary  of  the  Common¬ 
wealth  will  send  to  the  Auditor  of  Accounts  a  copy  of  this  Order  for  his 


19 


guidance,  and  a  copy  also  to  the  chairman  of  the  Commissioners  on  the 
Troy  and  Greenfield  Railroad. 

Order  adopted  February  3,  1863. 

Oliver  Warner,  Secretary 
Secretary’s  Department,  Boston,  Feb.  4,  1863. 

A  true  Copy.  Attest : 

Oliver  Warner, 

Secretary  of  the  Commonwealth. 

In  July  Mr.  Brooks  presented  to  the  governor  a  requisition 
for  twenty-five  thousand  dollars.  An  Order  was  laid  before  the 
council  in  the  following  terms: — “  Ordered,  that  $25,000  be 
paid  to  the  commissioners,  &c.,  to  enable  them  to  carry  out  the 
provisions  of  chap.  214,  sect.  2, 1863.”  Mr.  Brooks  submitted  no 
bills,  no  statement  of  the  purposes  for  which  the  money  was 
needed  ;  hut  autocratically  demanded  it,  and  threatened  to 
resign  unless  it  was  voted  unconditionally.  It  was  argued  that 
the  Act  of  1863  made  it  the  duty  of  the  council  to  vote  what¬ 
ever  money  was  “  required  ”  by  the  commissioners.  To  this  it 
*  was  replied  that  the  phraseology  of  the  Act  of  1863  was  pre¬ 
cisely  the  same,  upon  this  point,  as  that  of  1862.  In  both 
cases  the  language  was,  (sect.  7  of  1862,  and  sect.  2  of  1863,) 
“  The  governor  is  hereby  authorized  to  draw  his  warrant  on  the 
treasurer  of  the  Commonwealth  for  such  sums  as  may  be 
required,  <fcc.,  &c. and  if  the  council  were  justified  by 
the  Act  of  1862  in  passing  the  Order  of  Feb.  3, 1863,  they  would, 
unless  they  rescinded  that  Order,  have  stultified  themselves  in 
voting  this  sum  after  the  legislature  of  1863  had  used  the  same 
language  under  which  that  Order  was  passed.  Besides,  the  Act 
of  1863  went  further  than  that  of  1862  in  placing  with  the  council 
the  control  of  this  matter,  by  providing  that  the  commissioners, 
when  required,  “  shall  present  to  the  governor  and  council  an 
account  of  all  contracts  entered  into  by  them  as  such  commis¬ 
sioners,  and  of  all  payments  and  charges  by  them  made,  with 
their  vouchers  therefor,  which  vouchers  and  accounts  shall  be 
examined,  and  if  found  correct  and  in  good  faith,  shall  he 
allowed  by  the  governor  and  council ;  but  no  lease  of  any  part 
of  said  railroad,  nor  any  contract  amounting  to  more  than  ten 
thousand  dollars  shall  be  made  by  said  commissioners  without 
the  consent  of  the  governor  and  council.”  Thus  carefully  did 


20 


the  legislature  guard  the  treasury  from  the  drafts  of  Mr. 
Brooks,  and  thus  clearly  was  the  duty  of  the  council  defined. 
The  council,  after  a  long  and  sharp  discussion,  rejected  the 
Order,  advancing  the  $25,000  to  Mr.  Brooks,  one  councillor 
only  and  the  lieutenant-governor,  voting  in  the  affirmative. 
Mr.  Brooks  did  not  resign  ! 

The  whole  matter  was  then  referred  to  a  committee  who 
submitted  the  following  report : — 

“  The  undersigned,  to  whom  was  referred  the  communication  of  the 
Commissioners  of  the  Troy  and  Greenfield  Railroad  and  Hoosac  Tunnel 
of  July  20th,  1863,  have  conferred  with  J.  W.  Brooks,  Esq.,  Chairman 
of  said  Commissioners : — The  Committee  find  that  Mr.  Brooks  has 
already  used  several  thousand  dollars  for  drills,  &c.,  and  will  be 
obliged  to  use  [several  thousand  more  for  other  purposes,  the  details 
of  which  cannot  now  be  given ;  but  Mr.  Brooks  promises  that  a  full 
detailed  report  shall  be  given  to  the  governor  and  council  in  thirty  days 
from  this  date,  and  every  thirty  days  thereafter. 

“  Your  Committee  would  therefore  recommend  that  an  Order  be  passed 
placing  to  the  credit  of  said  Commissioners,  the  sum  of  fifteen  thou¬ 
sand  dollars,  agreeably  to  2d  section  of  the  214th  chap,  of  the  Acts  of 
the  current  year.” 

An  Order  in  accordance  with  the  recommendation  of  this 
report  was  adopted,  and  Mr.  Brooks  pocketed  the  money  and 
the  affront.  After  this  resistance  by  the  council  to  his  insolence, 
Mr.  Brooks  mended  his  manners. 

Immediately  after  the  passage  of  the  Act  of  1863,  it  was 
found  that  Mr.  Brooks  was  determined  to  proceed  immediately 
to  the  construction  of  the  road  from  Greenfield  to  the  tunnel, 
on  the  location  made  by  Mr.  Haupt.  Members  of  the  coun¬ 
cil  thought  that  if  the  road  were  to  be  built  by  the  State,  it 
should  be  of  a  character*  worthy  of  the  State.  Without  a  dis¬ 
senting  voice  all  the  members  of  the  council  accepted  the  Act 
of  the  legislature  of  1863,  as  conclusive  of  its  purpose  to 
complete  the  work ;  but  a  majority  of  the  council  insisted  that 
the  location  should  be  revised  with  the  view  of  adopting  a  route 
with  engineering  characteristics  fitting  it  for  a  great  commercial 
road.  To  secure  this,  the  following  Order  was  passed  : — 


21 


COMMONWEALTH  OF  MASSACHUSETTS. 

Council  Chamber,  Boston,  June  2d,  1863. 

Ordered ,  That  the  Commissioners  cause  Mr.  Laurie  forthwith  to 
survey  the  route  between  the  east  end  of  the  tunnel,  and  Bardwell’s 
Ferry,  with  a  view  to  ascertaining  what  changes  of  location  ought  to  be 
made,  and  in  directing  the  route  thus  obtained  and  giving  the  data  for  a 
reliable  comparison  of  the  cost  and  of  the  engineering  characteristics  of 
of  the  present  line,  and  the  line  thus  obtained,  as  parts  of  a  great  com¬ 
mercial  road.  The  report  to  be  made  before  the  first  day  of  July  next. 

It  was  apparent  that  the  time  was  too  short  to  make  proper 
surveys;  but,  determined  to  show  no  factious  opposition,  all  the 
members  acquiesced.  Without  consulting  Mr.  Brooks — for  the 
obvious  reason  that  the  Act  of  1863,  sect.  1,  placed  this  matter  of 
alterations  in  the  line  of  the  road  entirely  under  the  control  of 
the  governor  and  council — Mr.  Laurie  was  immediately  tele¬ 
graphed  to  by  the  governor,  and  directed  to  commence  the 
surveys  forthwith. 

Mr.  Laurie  reported  at  once  to  Mr.  Brooks.  “  I  am  here, 
Mr.  Brooks,  to  make  the  surveys  ordered.”  “  What  order  ? 
what  surveys  ?  ”  replied  the  autocrat.  “  The  surveys  ordered 
by  the  governor  and  council.”  “  I  have  ordered  no  surveys  and 
want  none.  When  I  need  your  services,  I  will  send  for  you. 
Go  about  your  business !  ”  and  he  went,  and  thus  closed  his  ser¬ 
vice  under  Mr.  Brooks.  The  result  was,  that  the  Order  of  the 
council  was  defied  ;  no  surveys  were  made,  but  the  work  on  the 
road  was,  for  the  time,  abandoned.  It  was  probably  Mr.  Brooks’ 
impunity  in  repudiating  the  authority  of  the  governor  and 
council  that  emboldened  him  in  his  attempt,  in  July  following, 
to  seize  the  key  of  the  State  treasury,  uncontrolled  by  the 
governor  and  council. 

Mr.  Laurie’s  sturdy  Scotch  integrity  disqualified  him  for  Mr. 
Brooks’  purposes.  When  Mr.  Laurie  presented  to  Mr.  Brooks 
his  report  published  with  the  first  report  of  the  commissioners, 
it  contained  statements  and  conclusions  unsatisfactory  to  Mr. 
Brooks,  and  the  railway  king,  who  was  determined  that  the 
reports  should  justify  his  foregone  conclusions,  demanded  the 
suppression  of  some  portions  of  the  report  and  the  modification 
of  others.  Mr.  Laurie,  with  a  professional  reputation  of  the 


22 


highest  character  at  stake,  after  making  such  concessions  as  he 
could  honestly  make,  resolutely  refused  to  yield  to  Mr.  Brooks’ 
imperious  demands  upon  material  points.  Then  “  never  more 
be  officer  of  mine.”  But  his  report,  when  carefully  read,  is  a 
practical  condemnation  of  the  whole  project.  We  have  no  time 
to  examine  it  in  detail ;  nor  is  this  hardly  necessary,  after  the 
extracts  we  have  given  from  “  Civil  Engineer’s  ”  article.  If 
one  will  read  the  concluding  pages  of  Mr.  Laurie’s  report, 
commencing  with  the  “  Comparison  with  other  routes,”  he  will 
have  no  doubt  as  to  Mr.  Laurie’s  real  judgment.  Undoubt¬ 
edly,  had  the  report  contained  a  full  expression  of  his  views, 
it  would  have  been  impossible  to  torture  from  it  any  other 
conclusions  than  those  which,  it  is  well  known,  he  entertains. 

The  head  and  front  of  Mr.  Laurie’s  offending  are  found  in  the 
following  passages  from  his  report  on  the  “  Deerfield  Route,” 
(pp.  170  et  seq.')  “  It  (the  Deerfield  route)  has  489  degrees  less 
curvature,  150  feet  less  rise  and  fall,  and  reduces  the  maximum 
grade  on  the  T.  &  G.  Railroad  ascending  wrest,  from  58.6  to 
50.16  feet  per  mile.  The  length  of  the  through  route  is 
reduced  by  this  line  t9q20  of  a  mile.”  He  then  shows  that  the 
Deerfield  route  would  cost  $97,975  more  than  the  Greenfield — 
a  sum  which,  taking  into  account  the  saving  of  distance  by  the 
Deerfield  route,  and  its  superior  engineering  characteristics,  is 
entirely  insignificant  in  locating  a  great  commercial  road.  We 
quote  again  :  “  The  Deerfield  route  is  much  superior  to  the 
present  road  as  a  through  line ;  but  it  will  not  accommodate 
Greenfield  nor  the  local  business  of  the  Deerfield  Valley  with 
that  town  so  well.”  Considering  that  Greenfield  has  already 
two  railroads  passing  through  the  village,  connecting  with  Bos¬ 
ton  and  New  York  on  the  east  and  south,  and  with  Vermont 
and  Montreal  on  the  north,  it  would  hardly  seem  that  her 
claims  should  offset  all  the  advantages  of  the  Deerfield  route 
for  a  through  road.  “  The  nearest  suitable  depot  is  two-thirds 
of  a  mile  further  from  the  village  than  the  present  junction.” 
He  concludes :  “  Viewed  as  a  through  line,  the  saving  of 

nearly  a  mile  in  distance,  489  degrees  of  curvature,  the  reduc¬ 
tion  of  the  maximum  grade,  and  the  avoidance  of  the  Green 
River  bridge,  with  its  sharp  curve,  would  be  of  considerable 
importance.” 


23 


And  yet  Mr.  Brooks  persists  in  his  determination,  though 
checked  by  the  action  of  the  governor  and  council,  to  build  the 
road  on  the  Greenfield  route.  In  addition  to  the  increased 
distance  and  the  heavier  grades,  every  ton  of  the  immense 
traffic  which  he  fancies  is  coming  over  his  road  would  be 
obliged  to  describe  one  entire  circle  and  a  third  of  another 
more  by  the  Greenfield  than  by  the  Deerfield  route  in  passing 
over  eight  miles  of  road.  Still  Mr.  Brooks  persists  ;  and  only 
last  summer  he  ordered  new  surveys  with  a  view  to  resuming 
work  on  the  road.  And  whom  did  he  employ  as  engineer  ? 
A  man  of  unbiassed  judgment,  of  recognized  integrity  (I  mean 
professional,)  of  large  engineering  experience  and  capacity  ? 
No,  but  Alfred  R.  Field,  of  Greenfield  !  I  say  nothing  of  Mr. 
Field’s  personal  character  ;  but  I  affirm  that  any  fair-minded 
man  who  will  make  himself  familiar  with  Mr.  Field’s  conduct 
in  connection  with  this  enterprise,  especially  if  he  will  read 
pages  25,  26  and  27  of  Mr,  Kimball’s  report  (House  Doc¬ 
ument  185,  I860,)  and  pages  81  and  82  of  the  appendix, 
can  come  to  no  other  conclusion  than  that  Mr.  Field  was 
the  very  last  man  in  the  State  to  have  been  appointed  engi¬ 
neer.  But  he  was  just  the  man  for  Mr.  Brooks,  and  he  was  set 
to  work.  Luckily  for  the  State,  Mr.  Felton  resigned  last  sum¬ 
mer,  and  James  M.  Shute  was  appointed  as  his  successor. 
Mr.  Shute  is  well  known  as  a  “  tunnel  man  ;  ”  but  he  is  a  gentle¬ 
man  of  the  most  cautious  and  exact  business  habits,  of  inde¬ 
pendence  and  integrity.  He,  as  well  as  Mr.  Holmes,  saw  the 
folly  of  building  the  road  ;  and  they  voted  Mr.  Brooks  down, 
and  stopped  the  waste  of  money  on  that  wretched  location. 

We  have  brought  the  history  of  the  tunnel  down  to  1863. 
We  are  compelled  to  be  brief,  and  have  therefore  exhibited 
but  a  very  small  portion  of  the  trickery  and  rascality  of  the 
management.  Following  as  closely  as  may  be  the  order  of  time, 
let  us  look  next  at  the  item  of  the  amount  of  the  people’s  money 
applied  by  Mr.  Brooks  to 

The  Payment  of  Mr.  Haupt’s  Debts. 

I  have  not  the  data  for  giving  the  exact  aggregate.  It  lies 
somewhere  between  two  hundred  and  three  hundred  thousand 
dollars !  It  will  be  remembered  that  the  Act  of  1862  authorized 
the  commissioners  to  “  audit  and  allow  all  just  claims  for  labor, 


24 


service,  land  damages  Ac.,  &c.,  and  may  procure  the  release  of 
all  attachments  and  discharge  all  liens  on  said  materials.” 
Now,  the  only  justification  for  the  payment,  by  the  commis¬ 
sioners,  of  any  claims  was,  first,  that  the  legislature  had 
expressly  specified  the  payment  of  certain  claims  ;  or  secondly 
that  there  were  valid  liens  on  any  of  said  materials  which 
it  was  the  interest  of  the  State  to  discharge ;  or  thirdly,  that 
the  claims  were  “just;”  that  is,  of  course,  “just  claims” 
against  the  State. 

It  cannot  be  argued  for  a  moment  that  the  legislature 
specified  any  of  these  claims  as  entitled  to  be  paid.  The 
Senate,  after  full  discussion,  had  rejected  the  bill  which 
appropriated  $150,000  upon  the  very  ground  that  the  money  was 
intended  to  pay  Mr.  Haupt’s  debts  for  “  labor,  services,  mate¬ 
rials  and  land  damages  ”  for  every  dollar  of  which  the  State  had 
already  paid  Mr.  Haupt.  If  they  had  intended  such  payment 
they  would  have  said  so ;  and  the  provision  would  have  killed 
this  bill  as  it  did  the  committee’s  bill.  They  did  not  say  so  ; 
and  therefore  the  only  inference  is,  that  they  intended  that  the 
commissioners  should  pay  only  “  just  claims  ”  against  the 
State. 

Nor,  secondly,  can  it  it  be  maintained  that  any  considerable 
portion  of  the  materials  were  subject  to  valid  liens.  With 
regard  to  the  whole  of  them,  with  a  single  inconsiderable  excep¬ 
tion,  these  pretended  liens  could  not  have  stood  an  hour’s 
investigation.  We  cannot  examine  them  all.  Take  one  :  the 
claim  of  the  Rensellaer  Iron  Company.  Mr.  Haupt  received 
from  the  treasury  State  scrip  as  follows  :  on  July  10th, 
1861,  $88,000  ;  on  July  11th,  $55,000  ;  and  on  the  12th,  $500. 
These  sums  included  payment  for  iron  sold  to  him  by  the 
Rensellaer  Iron  Company,  and  the  scrip  was  advanced  to  Mr. 
Haupt  upon  his  certificate  that  the  iron  had  been  delivered  by 
him  to  the  Commonwealth.  Mr.  Haupt  paid  a  part'  of  the 
proceeds  of  this  scrip  to  the  agent  of  the  company,  and  on  the 
same  day ,  July  11th,  this  same  agent  attached  the  iron*  for  a 
balance  due  the  Rensellaer  Iron  Company  !  And  yet  this  claim 
was  allowed  by  the  commissioners,  and,  I  am  sorry  to  add, 
approved  by  the  council  in  1863. 

Could  such  a  claim  be  said,  in  any  respect,  to  be  a  “just 
claim  ”  against  the  State?  Observe,  that  for  these  materials,  as 


25 


well  as  lor  nearly,  if  not  quite  all  the  other  claims  allowed,  and 
paid  by  the  commissioners,  the  State  had  once  paid  Mr.  Haupt 
in  full.  It  might  be  a  pardonable  act  of  generosity  for  the 
State  to  pay  the  claims  for  land-damages,  though  the  parties  all 
had  ample  security  against  Mr.  Haupt,  under  the  laws,  and 
voluntarily  relinquished  it ;  but  the  second  payment  of  these 
large  amounts  to  sub-contractors  and  to  this  company  in  another 
State,  which  made  the  sale  to  Mr.  Haupt  with  their  eyes  open, 
was  an  absolutely  inexcusable  and  wanton  squandering  of  the 
State’s  money.  It  was  not  the  business  of  the  State  to  collect 
the  bills  of  the  Iron  Company.  If  they  would  dance  in  such 
company,  they  must  expect  to  pay  the  piper.  We  surely 
ought  not  to  have  paid  for  heating  the  poker. 

There  never  was  a  more  atrocious  swindle  than  the  payment 
of  these  claims,  especially  those  of  the  sub-contractors  and  the 
Iron  Company.  Of  course,  I  do  not  put  the  whole  responsibility 
upon  the  commissioners.  The  majority  of  the  council  must 
divide  it  with  them.  The  only  possible  ground  upon  which 
they  could  be  affirmed  to  be  just  claims  against  the  State,  was, 
that  Mr.  Haupt  had  been  wronged  to  that  extent  by  the  action 
of  Governor  Andrew  and  the  State  engineer  in  1861,  and 
therefore  the  State  ought  to  give  him  this  money  to  enable 
him  to  pay  his  debts.  But  neither  the  commissioners  nor  the 
majority  of  the  council  will  plead  that  defence. 

Another  item  of  reckless  expenditure  by  Mr.  Brooks,  is  that 
for 


Power-Drills. 

From  the  day  Mr.  Brooks  entered  upon  this  work  up  to  this 
hour,  he  has  cherished  the  delusion  that  he  could  successfully 
operate  power-drills  in  the  Hoosac  rock,  and  this  against  the 
judgment  of  engineers  and  in  the  face  of  the  uniform  failure 
of  every  trial  he  has  made.  At  first,  he  was  so  perfectly  confi¬ 
dent  that  the  machines  used  at  Mount  Cenis  would  work,  that 
he  actually  remitted  the  money  abroad  for  the  purchase  of  those 
machines.  For  reasons  which  it  would  have  been  more  credi¬ 
table  to  have  learned  before  he  sent  the  money,  he  did  not  take 
them.  Next  he  tried  other  machines,  equally  confident  of  success. 
Thus,  in  his  report  made  in  1864,  he  says,  “  Drilling  machines 
4 


26 


will  not  be  likely  to  be  in  operation  at  this  place  (the  east  end,) 
before  next  midsummer.”  Of  the  central  shaft,  he  says,  “  We 
hope  by  the  latter  part  of  winter  to  get  some  automatic  drills  at 
work  in  the  shaft,  Ac.,  Ac.”  Of  the  west  shaft,  “  Machine-drills 
are  not  likely  to  be  used  here  before  next  spring,  and  perhaps 
not  till  early  summer.”  All  have  failed.  Now  he  tells  us  that 
drills  are  being  constructed  at  Fitchburg  which  are  to  work 
beautifully.  “  Confidence  is  a  plant  of  slow  growth.”  I  would 
hardly  set  limits  to  the  achievements  of  mechanical  skill  in 
perfecting  drills  for  this  purpose ;  but  the  failures  of  the  past 
destroy  all  confidence  in  his  predictions.  And  yet,  he  has  the 
hardihood  to  say  in  his  last  report,  “  If  machine  labor  comes  up 
to  the  estimate  as  well  as  hand  labor  lias  done ,  the  completion  of 
the  whole  work  may  be  brought  about  somewhat  within  the  time 
estimated.”  Why  did  he  not  say,  “  If  these  machines  work  as 
well  as  those  whose  success  1  have  as  confidently  predicted,  but 
which  have  all  failed,  Ac.,  Ac.”  We  knew  what  hand  labor 
would  do  ;  we  don’t  know  what  machines  will  do  ;  and  there¬ 
fore  the  comparison  is  defective  and  deceptive. 

Mr.  Brooks  has  taken  care  not  to  give  us,  in  separate  items, 
the  cost  of  his  fruitless  experiments  with  machine  drills.  In 
Mr.  Doane’s  last  report,  the  aggregate  of  the  items  of  cost  of 
machinery  is  $108,661.  What  portion  of  this  amount  was  for 
drills  we  have  no  means  of  knowing.  This  omission  seems 
remarkable  in  a  repor^which  descends  to  such  details  as  to  give 
the  cost  of  drill-holes  to  the  thousandth  part  of  an  inch,  and  of 
candles  to  the  thousandth  part  of  a  pound!  We  only  know 
that  the  cost  of  other  machinery,  in  addition  to  what  was  on 
hand  when  he  commenced  the  work,  has  been  small,  and  it  is  fair 
to  infer  that  a  considerable  portion  of  the  above  aggregate  has 
gone  for  power-drills.  Whatever  it  has  been,  it  has  all  been 
wasted. 

Another  of  Mr.  Brooks’  pet  schemes  is 
The  Deerfield  Dam. 

Last  year  I  published  some  statements  relating  to  this  folly, 
and  I  reaffirm  every  one  of  them.  First,  as  to  the  power.  It 
will  be  remembered  that  the  engineer,  in  his  report  for  1864, 
said, — 


27 


“  After  a  thorough  discussion  of  the  comparative  merits  and  cost  of 
steam  and  water-power,  taking  into  account  the  fact  that  the  required 
power  must  be  a  continuous  one ,  working  through  the  twenty-four  hours  of 
every  day ,  it  was  determined  to  build  a  dam  in  the  Deerfield  River 
which  would  furnish  a  power  equal  to  about  eight  hundred  horses.” 

Eight  hundred  horse-power,  where  the  power  is  required  for 
continuous  working  through  twenty-four  hours  in  a  day,  means 
power  to  that  amount  for  the  whole  of  every  day  in  the  year. 
Mr.  Brooks  says,  in  the  same  report : — 

“  It  is  designed  to  use  the  water  upon  turbine  wheels,  one  of  which, 
of  about  one  hundred  horse-power,  is  already  upon  the  ground.  This 
will  be  put  in  operation  upon  air  compressors,  and  its  size  and  fitness 
tested  before  others  are  procured.” 

This  means  that  there  must  be  a  continuous  power  of  over  one 
hundred  horses.  I  stated  that  I  learned  on  the  ground  from 
one  who  knew ,  that  the  last  time  the  water  was  measured,  it 
gave  about  fifty  horse-power ;  and  that,  in  my  judgment,  when 
we  were  there  in  September,  the  amount  was  much  less  than 
that.  No  authentic  contradictions  to  these  statements  have 
been  made.  Mr.  Doane,  in  his  report  this  year,  gives  measure¬ 
ments  of  the  flow  of  water  over  the  crest  of  the  dam  in  August, 
October,  November,  and  December ;  but  no  measurements  are 
given  for  September,  and  of  course  the  measurements  given 
do  not  affect  my  statements  as  to  the  quantity  of  water  in  that 
month.  But  he  does  give  a  statement  of  the  amount  of  rain 
falling  in  August  as  2t4q2q  inches,  and  in  September  as  of 
an  inch,  the  amount  in  September  being  a  trifle  less  than 
-j4y  of  that  in  August.  Now  his  measurements  for  the  last 
ten  days  in  August  give  of  a  foot  as  the  average  flow 

of  water  over  the  dam,  for  each  of  those  days.  Reducing 
this  in  the  same  proportion  as  the  amount  of  rain  in  September 
fell  short  of  that  in  August,  and  we  have  of  a  foot  as  the 
daily  average  flow  of  water  ih  September.  Mr.  Doane  furnishes 
us  with  a  table  giving  the  horse-power  to  each  tenth  of  a  foot 
of  water  over  the  crest.  One-tenth  of  a  foot  gives  42.5  theo¬ 
retical  horse-power  ;  which,  two-thirds  being  “  effective  ”  power, 
(and  that  is  more  than  he  will  ever  get  out  of  Mr.  Brooks’ 
turbine  wheels,)  gives  28.3,  as  the  effective  horse-power  to  each 


28 


tenth  of  a  foot  of  flow.  The  average  flow  in  September  we 
have  found  to  have  been  of  a  foot..  This  is  equivalent  to 
a  theoretical  power  of  22.5  horses,  or  an  effective  power  of 
fifteen  horses ;  that  is,  in  September  they  had  a  continuous 
power  of  fifteen  horses !  If  this  is  not  hoisting  the  engineer 
with  his  own  petard,  I  don’t  know  when  the  sport  was  enjoyed. 
I  gave  it  as  my  opinion  last  year  that  the  water,  when  I  was 
there,  would  not  give  “  ten  horse-power  for  twenty-four  hours 
in  the  day ;  ”  and  Mr.  Doane’s  own  figures  show  that  I  set  the 
amount  above  the  actual  measurements.* 

What  Mr.  Doane  means  when  he  says,  “  it  was  measured 
during  the  season  several  times,  and  the  least  quantity  found 
gave  a  theoretical  power  of' one  hundred  and  sixteen  horses,”  I 
cannot  imagine  ;  when  his  own  measurements  give  two  days 
of  less  than  fifty  theoretical  horse-power,  and  several  of  less 
than  a  hundred.  We  are  left  t6  guess  why  no  measurements 
are  given  for  September. 

It  has  been  alleged  that  the  past  season  has  been  one  of 
unprecedented  dryness  for  these  months  ;  but  Mr.  Doane  makes 
the  statement  that  last  year  the  amount  of  rain  in  those  four 
months  was  7^90V  inches,  and  in  1829,  it  was  8^^  inches,  and 
in  1846,  9t4q2o  inches.  The  difference — being  in  one  year 
of  an  inch,  and  in  the  other,  inches — if  averaged  over 
four  months  of  each  year,  would  hardly  give  Mr.  Brooks  a 
continuous  power  of  eight  hundred  horses  ! 

But,  it  seems  from  the  last  report,  that  Mr.  Brooks  is  not 
sure  of  even  this  insignificant  power.  Mr.  Doane  says  : — 

“  The  canal  is  finished,  and  water  was  let  in  on  the  24th  of  November; 
but  on  account  of  the  porous  nature  of  the  natural  banks,  it  has  been 

*  Strictly  speaking,  the  actual  power  in  September  was  much  less  than  the 
above  calculation  gives.  It  will  be  seen  from  Mr.  Doane’s  tables,  that  as  the 
flow  of  water  decreases,  the  power  diminishes  relatively,  much  more  rapidly ; 
thus,  five-tenths  of  a  foot  of  flow  of  water  gives  917  theoretical  horse-power ; 
four-tenths  gives  629;  three-tenths,  380;  tfao-tenths,  176;  one-tenth,  42  theo¬ 
retical  horse-power ;  at  this  rate  of  diminution,  t°^8o2jt  °f  a  f°°t  °f  flow  °f  water 
would  give  theoretically  two  horse-power ;  effectively,  nothing.  As  a  matter 
of  fact,  any  amount  of  power  less  than  a  hundred  horse  continuous  power,  is 
equivalent,  for  use  at  the  Tunnel,  to  no  power  at  all ;  for  any  power  much  less 
than  a  hundred  horses,  will  not  start  a  turbine  wheel  of  a  hundred  horse¬ 
power  ;  of  course,  any  less  power  will  not  drive  it  up  to  speed  to  do  the 
work  of  a  hundred  horses. 


29 


filled  gradually,  and  has  as  yet  only  been  raised  seven  feet,  or  to  a  level 
one  foot  below  the  crest  of  the  dam. 

“  The  banks  leak  very  considerably,  but  no  giving  away  is  looked 
for.  By  putting  in  sawdust,  and  stirring  the  silt  of  the  canal,  they 
will  no  doubt  by-and-by  become  tight.” 

Any  experienced  owner  of  water-power  will  doubt  the  last 
prediction.  I  never  before  heard  of  stopping  a  leak  in  a  dam 
or  canal,  with  sawdust,  except  as  a  temporary  expedient ;  and 
if  the  natural  banks  are  of  so  porous  a  nature  as  to  “  leak 
considerably,”  Mr.  Brooks  will  find  that  he  can  only  get  a 
tight  canal  by  building  bottom  and  sides  of  stone  laid  in  cement. 
Here  goes  I  know  not  how  many  thousand  dollars  more. 
Meantime  this  “  considerable  leak  ”  will  still  further  reduce  his 
power. 

It  is  upon  such  a  stream  as  this  that  Mr.  Brooks  has  built  his 
magnificent  structure. 


Cost  of  the  Deerfield  Dam. 

Last  year  I  estimated  the  cost  of  the  water-power  at  1200,000. 
We  have  now  Mr.  Brooks’  figures  of  cost  up  to  the  date  of  the 
report .  The  final  cost  remains  to  be  known,  as  it  seems  that 
they  are  still  at  work  on  the  buildings  and  the  wheel-pits,  “  a 
fourth  being  just  begun.”  The  leaks  in  the  canal,  too,  are  yet 
to  be  stopped.  But  we  will  take  the  figures  as  they  are  given. 

The  items  of  the  cost  of  the  dam,  including  waste-gates,  canal 
and  wheel-pits,  are  separately  given ;  so  also  is  the  machinery 
at  the  dam.  The  cost  of  “engineering  and  superintendence” 
for  the  whole  work  is  put  in  gross  at  $59,999.90.  The  cost  of 
all  the  buildings  at  the  east  end  is  put  at  $27,851.65.  It  will 
not  be  unfair  to  charge  one-third  of  the  engineering  and  super¬ 
intendence,  and  one-third  of  the  buildings  at  the  east  end,  to 
the  dam.  We  have  then  the  following  items  of  the  cost  of  the 
dam  and  appurtenances,  as  given  on  page  52  of  the  report : — 

Deerfield  dam, . $125,919  74 


Excavation  and  masonry  at  east  end  of  dam,  .  .  .  12,535  86 

Wheel-pits,  .  45,878  09 

Gates  and  overflow,  .  .  .  .  .  .  9,419  73 

Race  or  canal, .  21,353  03 


30 


One-third  engineering  and  superintendence,  .  .  .  $19,999  97 

One-third  buildings  east  end,  ......  9,283  88 

Machinery  at  Deerfield  dam,  .....  10,297  92 

Total  cost  of  dam,  buildings  and  machinery,  .  $254,688  22 

Probably  a  part  of  these  buildings  might  be  used  for  steam- 
power  whenever  they  introduce  it,  as  they  must  before  their 
operations  require  a  continuous  power  of  fifty  horses.  Strike 
off  the  odd  thousands,  and  we  have  the  round  sum  of  $250,000 
as  the  cost  of  the  water-power  and  appurtenances  up  to  last 
December ! 

It  seems  absolutely  incredible  that  any  man  in  his  senses 
could  have  committed  this  folly.  I  think  too  highly  of  even  Mr. 
Brooks’  business  capacity  to  believe  that  he  could  have  done  it 
with  his  own  money.  But  it  is  a  State  work,  and  there  is  plenty 
of  money,  and  Mr.  Brooks  would  immortalize  himself  by  build¬ 
ing  a  dam  compared  with  which  Holyoke  and  Lawrence  should 
be  but  boys’  play.  Accordingly  he  spends  an  hour  or  two  of  a 
pleasant  spring  day,  when  the  stream  was  full,  in  an  explora¬ 
tion  ;  listens  to  the  statements  of  the  “  oldest  inhabitant,”  as  to 
the  permanence  of  the  power,  orders  surveys  to  be  made,  and, 
sitting  comfortably  in  his  office  in  Merchants’  Exchange,  adopts 
his  plan  and  gives  his  orders — sic  volo ,  sicjubeo,  and  the  State 
pays  over  a  quarter  of  a  million  of  dollars,  nearly  every  dollar 
of  which  has  been  thrown  away.  For  remember,  they  must 
introduce  steam-power;  and  the  fixed  investment  for  this  power 
must  be  just  as  great,  and  of  course  the  interest  on  this  invest¬ 
ment  the  same  as  if  there  had  not  been  a  dollar  spent  for 
water-power.  It  follows  that  the  only  return  the  State  will  get 
for  this  enormous  cost  of  water-power  will  be  the  saving  of  the 
fuel  which  would  be  used  for  steam-power  during  those  portions 
of  the  year  when  water-power  shall  be  used. 

Let  us  figure  the  cost  of  this  power.  I  avoid  the  domain  of 
poetry.  I  do  not  criticize  Mr.  Doane’s  graphic  sketch  on  page 
23  of  his  report.  I  can  well  understand  how  natural  it  is  that 
he  should  seek  to  forget  ugly  facts,  and  enjoy  the  artistic  beauty 
of  Mr.  Brooks’  cascades.  But  we  must  deal  with  jprosaic 
figures  and  facts.  The  dam  will  have  cost  when  finished,  at 
least  $275,000.  I  repeat  what  I  said  last  year,  that  as  a  water- 


31 


power  for  use,  after  Mr.  Brooks  has  done  with  it,  no  business 
man  would  pay  for  it  and  use  it  there,  $10,000.  He  might  get 
that  worth  of  material  out  of  it  to  carry  away  ;  but  it  would 
not  be  worth  that  to  use  there.  Ten  thousand  dollars  will  buy 
a  larger  continuous  water-power  than  that,  within  twenty  miles 
of  Boston.  The  loss,  when  it  comes  to  a  sale,  will  be 
$265,000.  Mr.  Brooks  says  he  shall  finish  the  tunnel  in  seven 
years.  This  gives  an  annual  depreciation  of  $87,855.  The 
interest  on  the  cost  will  be  $16,500.  But  they  must  have 
steam-power  too,  and  use  it,  at  least  for  six  months  of  the  year  ; 
for  Mr.  Doane’s  measurements  will  show  that  they  have  had 
less  power  this  winter  than  they  had  last  summer.  The  power 
then  averaged,  for  August,  seventy  horse  effective  power ;  for 
September,  calculated  from  his  statement,  fifteen  ;  for  October, 
from  his  measurement,  105.  These  figures  show  that  they 
must  have  auxiliary  power  for  three  or  four  months  in  summer 
and  fall,  and  nearly  as  long  in  winter.  We  make  the  calculations 
for  two  hundred  horse-power.  Two  steam-engines  of  a  hundred 
horse-power  each,  with  boilers  and  all  appurtenances,  will  cost 
at  the  outside  $20,000  each.  The  fuel  to  run  them  six  months 
will  cost  $9,000.  Depreciation,  ten  per  cent,  of  cost.  We 
have  then  the  following  as  the  annual  cost  of  water-power  with 
steam  as  auxiliary : — 


Interest  on  cost  of  dam  and  fixtures,  . 
Depreciation,  ^  of  $265,000, 

Interest  on  cost  of  steam-power, . 

Fuel  for  six  months,  .  .  .  . 

Depreciation,  .  .  .  .  . 


$16,500  00 
37,855  00 
2,400  00 
9,000  00 
4,000  00 


Annual  cost  of  mixed  power, 


$69,755  00 


Cost  for  seven  years,  . 


.  $488,285  00 


If  Mr.  Brooks  had  used  steam-power  instead  of  water,  the 
annual  cost  would  have  been — 


Interest  on  cost  of  engines, 
Fuel,  .... 
Depreciation,  . 


$2,400  00 
18,000  00 
4,000  00 


Annual  cost  of  steam-power,  . 


$24,400  00 


32 


Cost  for  seven  years, . $170,800  00 

Excess  of  cost  of  mixed  power,  .  .  .  317,485  00 

So  much  for  Mr.  Brooks’  theorizing.  True,  this  sum  is  a 
mere  trifle  in  the  grand  total  of  millions  which  the  whole  work 
involves ;  but  such  as  it  is,  a  man  of  common  sense  would 
have  saved  every  dollar. 

Mr.  Brooks  can  look  sharply  after  other  people.  He  saw 
very  clearly  the  mote  in  Mr.  Haupt’ s  eye,  in  the  shape  of  forty 
or  fifty  cents  in  the  value  at  which  the  pound  sterling  was 
computed  below  the  legal  rate,  amounting,  on  the  whole 
amount  of  sterling  scrip  issued  to  Mr.  Haupt,  to  some  forty 
thousand  dollars.  In  equity,  the  claim  of  the  State  against 
Mr.  Brooks  for  this  sum  of  $289,485,  ultimately  lost  by  build¬ 
ing  the  Deerfield  dam,  stands  on  a  better  foundation  than  the 
claim  on  which  judgment  has  been  rendered  against  Mr.  Haupt. 
But  Mr.  Haupt’s  friends  had  deserted  him,  and  Mr.  Brooks’ 
haven’t — yet. 

We  come  now  to  a  piece  of  folly  in  comparison  with  which 
the  transactions  thus  far  examined  have  been  the  perfection  of 
wisdom. 

The  West  Approach,  or  the  Demoralized  Rock. 

The  work  here  was  suspended  last  September,  and  nothing 
has  since  been  done.  Mr.  Doane  treads  very  gingerly  over  this 
ground.  His  account  of  last  year’s  operations  is  so  excellent  a 
specimen  of  how  not  to  tell  the  whole  truth,  and  yet  not  tell 
a  lie,  that  I  copy  it  entire. 

“In  December,  1864,  the  heading  was  begun,  and  in  a  few  weeks 
reached  a  distance  of  one  hundred  and  eleven  feet,  part  of  the  distance 
having  been  driven  and  timbered  up  at  the  rate  of  six  feet  per  day.  It 
was  very  dry  nearly  all  the  way,  and  did  not  trouble  the  workmen  by 
caving,  except  when  entering  the  face  of  the  rock,  and  before  the  timber 
support  could  reach  the  roof. 

“  One  Monday  morning,  it  was  found  that  the  perpendicular  forward 
face  of  the  heading  had  caved  in,  some  time  during  Sunday,  and  that  a 
great  deal  of  water  was  being  discharged.  The  caving  continued  till  it 
reached  the  surface ,  forty  feet  overhead ,  so  the  heading  was  stopped .” 
(Well  it  might  be — forty  feet  of  porridge !) 


33 


u  The  thorough  cut  was  afterwards  extended  by  its  different  levels 
•  further  east,  and  in  June  and  July,  1865,  some  cribs  were  sunk  down  at 
the  forward  end  of  the  heading,  advancing  it  about  twenty-eight  feet. 
It  was  discovered  that  a  large  stream,  coming  up  through  a  hole  some 
ten  feet  deep,  was  what  stopped  the  heading  in  December.  This  is  now 
passed,  but  there  is  more  or  less  water  in  front  still,  which  makes  it 
somewhat  difficult  to  get  underground  again  by  the  ordinary  methods, 
though,  I  think,  not  impracticable. 

“  But  about  the  time  these  cribs  had  been  sunk  to  grade,  came  the 
west  shaft  developments,  which,  in  connection  with  the  facts  learned  by 
sinking  the  wells,  indicated  the  necessity  of  a  change  of  plan.  It  was 
found  that  there  was  little  hope  of  reaching  solid  rock.  Though  a 
heading  could  be  driven  through  this  material  easier  than  the  full-size 
tunnel,  it  would  have  a  tendency,  if  the  enlargement  did  not  at  once 
follow,  to  injure  the  texture  and  firmness  of  the  rock,  to  enlarge  the 
water- filled  fissures  cut  by  the  passage  of  the  heading,  and  make  the 
enlargement  of  the  tunnel  more  difficult. 

“  It  seemed  evident  enough  that  simple  heading  had  better  be  aban¬ 
doned  ;  that  the  tunnel  should  be  commenced  full  size  and  permanently 
lined  either  with  brick  or  iron,  as  fast  as  the  work  advanced.  As  it 
would  require  some  time  to  choose  between  the  methods  of  proceeding, 
and  as  the  season  was  so  far  advanced  as  to  render  it  impossible  to 
make  or  get  bricks  in  sufficient  quantities,  I  thought  it  wise  to  stop  fur¬ 
ther  work  at  once,  and  to  send  the  men  to  the  east  end,  where  they 
could  profitably  be  employed  in  completing  before  winter  what  work 
was  there  to  be  done.” 

He  then  tries  to  convince  himself  that  if  he  can  get  along 
until  he  passes  a  brook  overhead,  he  shall  find  better  material ; 
and  this  in  face  of  the  fact  that  he  has  got  to  pass  under  a  valley 
which  is  the  receptacle  of  all  the  water  of  the  western  slope  of 
the  mountain  ;  that  the  time  at  which  he  was  driven  off  by  the 
water  was,  according  to  his  own  statements,  the  driest  month 
ever  known  there ;  that  all  his  test  wells  towards  the  west  shaft, 
up  to  the  date  of  the  report,  reveal  the  same  demoralized  rock, 
with  large  quantities  of  water ;  and  that  in  the  west  heading 
of  the  west  shaft  he  encountered  the  same  material,  as  related 
in  the  following  paragraph  : — 

“  In  the  last  week  of  July,  there  was  noticed  a  marked  change  in  the 
character  of  the  rock.  It  began  to  look  rusty  in  color,  or  sappy,  as  if 
approaching  the  outside  of  the  ledge.  The  drill-bits  cutting  before  only 
5 


34 


three  and  three-fourths  inches  each,  now  cut  ten  inches  each.  Some 
pieces  of  rock  fell  from  the  roof,  which  was  a  very  unusual  thing,  and 
large  seams,  filled  with  a  decomposed  rock,  very  much  like  that  at  the 
west  end  began  to  appear.  These  seams  also  discharged  very  much 
water.  Fearing  that  further  progress  might  reach  ground  that  would 
break  in  from  above,  and  flood  both  headings,  and  it  being  especially 
important  that  the  east  heading,  having  so  far  to  penetrate,  should  not 
be  hindered,  a  discontinuance  of  the  work  in  the  west  heading  was 
ordered  on  the  2d  of  August.” 

And  yet  he  thinks  it  “  not  impracticable  to  get  under¬ 
ground. The  difficulty  is  not  so  much  in  getting  underground, 
as  in  keeping  on  after  he  gets  there.  Nobody  supposes  it  is 
impracticable,  with  time  and  money ;  but  the  questions  are, — 

What  will  it  Cost  ? 
and  will  it  be  worth  the  cost  ? 

The  distance  from  the  west  shaft  to  the  west  face  is  2,300 
feet, — all  demoralized  rock.  The  only  data  we  can  gather  from 
Mr.  Brooks’  reports  upon  which  to  estimate  the  cost  of  tunnel¬ 
ling  this  2,300  feet,  are  found  in  the  cost  of  the  work  thus  far 
done  at  the  west  approach.  The  whole  amount  expended  by 
Mr.  Brooks  at  the  west  approach  has  been  $134,794.  How 
much  advance  has  been  made  with  this  sum  it  is  difficult  to 
ascertain.  On  page  twenty-four  of  the  report  for  1864,  (House 
Document  No.  3, 1865,)  he  says,  “  we  have  made  an  open  cut  at 
this  point,”  (that  is,  the  point  where  Mr.  Haupt  left  off,)  *  *  * 
“  until  we  are  arrived  at  the  point  where  tunnelling  is  begun. 
The  first  timbering  was  set  up  about  twenty  days  ago,  and  some 
progress  has  been  made  in  penetrating  towards  the  west  shaft.” 
How  far  the  open  cut  was  carried,  or  what  progress  was  made 
in  tunnelling  in  twenty  days,  we  have  no  means  of  knowing. 
Both,  in  that  bad  material,  could  have  amounted  to  but  a  few 
feet.  In  his  report  this  year  Mr.  Doane  says,  that  “  in  Decem¬ 
ber,  1864,  the  heading  was  begun,  and  in  a  few  weeks  reached 
a  distance  of  111  feet,”  when,  one  Sunday,  in  utter  contempt 
of  the  fourth  commandment,  it  caved  in.  “The  thorough  cut 
was  afterwards  extended,”  (how  far,  we  don’t  know,)  and  in 
June  and  July  cribs  were  sunk,  “advancing  the  heading  about 
twenty-eight  feet.”  This, too,  has  now  caved;  and  cribs,  walls, 


35 


timbers  and  all  are  submerged  in  porridge.  From  the  best 
information  I  can  get,  the  actual  progress  from  the  point  where 
Mr.  Haupt  stopped  is  about  125  feet.  But  they  have  spent  here 
$134,794.  A  small  portion  of  this  has  probably  been  spent  in 
repairing  Mr.  Haupt’s  heading.  Allowing  $9,794  for  that,  (and, 
from  appearances,  this  is  a  liberal  allowance,)  and  the  cost  of 
this  progress  has  been  $125,000,  or  a  thousand  dollars  a  lineal 
foot.  At  this  rate,  the  2,300  feet  remaining  will  cost 
$2,300,000 ! 

But  all  experience  thus  far  at  this  point  proves  that  the 
remainder  of  *the  work  will  be  much  more  difficult  and 
expensive  than  the  commencement.  The  west  heading  of  the 
west  shaft  was  stopped  because  they  dared  not  go  further  for 
fear  of  an  inundation  of  porridge.  The  west  face  was 
abandoned  because  of  such  inundation.  Now  let  it  be  borne  in 
mind  that  the  work  was  stopped  by  this  irruption  of  water,  in 
September,  the  month  in  which  the  smallest  amount  of  rain 
fell  of  which  we  have  any  record.  At  Lowell,  T5o6^  of  an  inch ; 
at  Amherst,  in  the  tunnel  region,  t3q8^.  The  amount  of  rain  in 
each  of  three  other  months — the  driest  months  of  the  year 
— was  five  times  that  in  September.  1  have  before  me  records 
kept  at  several  points  in  Massachusetts  of  the  amount  of  rain 
for  each  month,  for  several  years  ;  and  one  of  these  gives  the 
fall  of  rain  at  Springfield,  as  follows  : — 


I860. 

1861. 

1863. 

1863. 

1864. 

1865. 

June, 

4.12 

3.31 

10.04 

1.70 

0.56 

3.74 

July, 

5.32 

3.94 

6.54 

9.77 

1.22 

3.86 

August,  . 

4.98 

5.35 

3.25 

3.35 

2.54 

1.67 

September, 

4.93 

3.36 

1.83 

2.44 

2.61 

.65 

October, . 

2.60 

5.19 

2.76 

4.23 

2.07 

4.57 

Aggregate  for  5  m’ths, 

DO  O  7 

21.95 

21.15 

24.42 

21.49 

9.00 

14.49 

It  thus  appears  that  the  aggregate  fall  of  rain  in  each  of  the 
four  years  next  preceding  1864,  when  they  first  struck  the 
demoralized  rock,  was  from  133  to  170  per  cent,  greater  than 


36 


it  was  in  1864,  and  from  50  to  70  per  cent,  greater  than  it  was 
in  1865  ;  that  in  the  months  of  August  and  September  of  the 
first  four  of  these  years,  it  was  from  two  to  four  times  greater 
than  in  the  same  months  of  1864  and  1865  ;  and  that  in  one 
month  it  was  sixteen  times  greater,  and  in  others  it  was  twelve 
or  fifteen  times  greater  than  in  the  month  of  September,  when 
they  abandoned  this  work. 

If  the  difficulties  of  penetrating  this  material  were  found 
insurmountable  last  September,  what  will  they  be  with  five,  ten, 
sixteen  times  more  water  in  the  soil  ? 

With  any  appliances  now  at  their  command,  they  admit  it  to 
be  useless  to  attempt  further  progress.  The  practical 
conclusion  to  which  engineers  have  arrived,  is  that  progress  can 
only  be  made  by  the  use  of  shields  similar  to  those  used  in  the 
Thames  tunnel.  Mr.  Doane  tries  to  think  that  a  part  of  the  work 
may  be  done  “  without  the  use  of  a  shield  ;  ”  but  he  discusses 
the  matter  with  the  evident  conviction  that  he  will  have  to 
use  them.  He  says  : 

“Mr.  Wm.  C.  Pickersgill,  now  of  East  Boston,  an  engineer  who  has 
had  experience  in  English  tunnels,  advises  to  put  in  a  shield  at  once, 
and  has  given  me  a  plan  of  one.  I  do  not  think  it  exactly  adapted  to 
our  case.  ” 

Now,  the  only  tunnel  ever  built  through  material  at  all 
similar  to  this  demoralized  rock,  is  that  under  the  Thames. 
Generally  the  material  in  the  Thames  tunnel  was  much  less 
difficult  of  management  than  this  porridge,  as  a  large  propor¬ 
tion  was  a  tenacious  clay,  nearly  impervious  to  water.  This 
tunnel  was  commenced  in  March,  1825, and  completed  in  August, 
1842.  Deducting  seven  years,  during  which  the  work  was  sus¬ 
pended  for  want  of  means,  the  work  occupied  nearly  eleven 
years.  The  length  is  1,300  feet.  The  cost  was  X 614,000,  or, 
in  round  numbers,  $3,070,000.  This,  remember,  was  at  gold 
prices  for  materials,  with  labor  at  “  starvation  prices  ” — sixty 
cents  a  day,  instead  of  two  dollars,  which  is  about  the  average 
price  at  the  Hoosac  tunnel.  The  cost  of  the  Thames  tunnel 
was  $2,361  per  lineal  foot  (!)  in  gold.  At  the  same  rate,  the  cost 
of  tunnelling  the  2,300  feet  of  demoralized  rock  would  be 
$5,430,300  in  gold !  at  prices  prevailing  here,  at  least  double 


37 


that  amount.  It  is  not  strange  that  even  Mr.  Brooks  hesitates 
to  attack  it. 

I  see  no  reasons  for  inferring  that  this  tunnel  will  cost  less, 
foot  for  foot,  than  did  the  Thames,  unless  Mr.  Brooks’  friends 
claim  that  he  is  a  better  engineer  than  Mr.  Brunei.  The 
excavation  for  the  Thames  tunnel  was  22J  feet  high  and  38 
feet  wide  ;  after  the  masonry  of  the  top  and  walls  was  built, 
the  clear  area  was  about  15  feet  high  and  28  to  30  feet  wide. 
If  walls  of  the  same  thickness  as  those  in  the  Thames  tunnel 
will  sustain  this  demoralized  rock,  the  excavation  here  will  be 
a  trifle  less  than  there.  But  of  that  nobody  can  be  sure.  The 
probability  is  that  the  masonry  here  must  be  thicker  than  was 
necessary  there,  and  that  the  original  excavation  must  be  even 
larger  than  that. 

Again,  the  irruptions  of  the  river  must  have  increased  the 
cost  of  the  Thames  tunnel.  I  cannot  find,  however,  that  these 
casualties  added  largely  to  the  cost.  At  the  first  irruption, 
only  25,000  cubic  feet  of  earth  were  thrown  into  the  tunnel ; 
of  course,  the  cost  of  removing  this  and  pumping  out  the 
water  was  an  inconsiderable  item.  This  occasioned  a  delay  of 
but  a  few  weeks.  The  next  irruption — the  largest — occasioned 
a  delay  of  about  three  months.  From  the  best  information  I 
can  get,  the  others  were  unimportant.  The  suspension  of  the 
work  for  seven  years,  and  the  embarrassment  for  want  of 
means,  also  added  somewhat  to  the  cost.  But  all  combined 
make  but  a  small  amount  in  proportion  to  the  whole  cost, — 
much  less  than  the  interest ,  which  is  not  included  in  the 
£614,000  given  as  the  cost. 

I  repeat,  then,  we  have  n<*  data  for  computing  the  cost  of 
this  work,  by  comparison  with  similar  works,  so  reliable  as  the 
cost  of  the  Thames  tunnel,  and  these  bring  the  cost  of  this  up 
to  $5,430,300  in  gold  !  These  figures  seem  fabulous ;  they 
certainly  are  frightful.  If  Mr.  Brooks  can  give  any  facts  to 
show  their  fallacy,  let  him  produce  them ;  but  neither  prophecy 
nor  rhetoric  will  do.  And  I  undertake  to  say  that  responsible 
contractors  cannot  be  found  who  will  guarantee  to  complete 
this  work  for  that  sum. 

With  these  facts  before  us,  I  hesitate  to  venture  an  estimate, 
as  a  reliable  one,  of  the 


38 


Cost  of  completing  the  Tunnel. 

Mr.  Brooks  says  : 

“  The  original  estimates  contained  in  the  Commissioners’  Report, 
made  in  February,  1863,  were  based  upon  the  cost  of  ordinary  labor  at 
one  dollar  per  day,  and  of  materials  at  a  corresponding  rate.  Since  the 
resumption  of  the  work,  so  great  has  been  the  advance  in  every  item  of 
expense  incident  to  the  prosecution  of  such  an  enterprise,  that  these 
estimates  must  necessarily  in  that  respect  be  modified.  The  Commis¬ 
sioners  feel  confident  that  with  such  modification ,  the  work  may  be 
completed  without  any  essential  variation  from  the  statements  of  cost 
heretofore  made.” 

Ah,  doubling  the  price  of  labor  and  materials  is  a  very 
“  essential  variation.” 

Mr.  Brooks’  original  estimates  of  cost  were  $5,719,330. 
These  estimates  were  based  on  the  cost  of  ordinary  labor  at  one 
dollar  per  day  of  eleven  hours.  Mr.  Doane  says  in  his  last 
report — 

“  Since  December  10,  1864,  wages  have  been  unchanged.  Outside 
common  laborers  receive  $1.50  per  day  of  ten  hours.  Miners  in  the 
enlargement  of  headings  receive  $2  per  day  of  ten  hours.  Miners  in 
the  east  end  and  west  shaft  headings,  as  well  as  central  shaft,  receive 
$2.25  per  day  of  eight  hours.  So  long  as  miners  in  the  coal  regions  can 
make  from  $5  to  $8  per  day,  it  is  useless  to  think  of  reducing  wages 
upon  the  tunnel.” 

The  reduction  of  the  hours  of  labor  and  the  increase  in  price 
makes  the  wages  about  double  the  rate  upon  which  the  original 
estimates  were  based.  Up  to  December  1, 1864,  wages  of  com¬ 
mon  laborers  ranged  from  $1.25  to  $1.75  per  day,  and  of 
miners,  from  $1.50  to  $2.00.  At  no  time  have  wages  been  as 
low  as  one  dollar  per  day  ;  so  that  all  the  work  done  up  to 
December  1864,  cost  from  twenty-five  to  seventy-five  per  cent, 
more  than  the  original  estimates. 

We  have  no  means  of  knowing  the  amount  of  money  expended 
in  1863,  as  Mr.  Brooks'  report  for  that  year  has  never  been 
published ,  and  after  diligent  search  I  have  been  unable  to  find  it. 
But  in  the  report  for  1864,  the  whole  amount  expended  on  the 
work,  since  its  assumption  by  the  State  up  to  December  1864,  is 
given  as  $415,483.  Allowingone-halfofthis  as  expended  in  1863 


39 


and  we  have  8207,741,  as  the  amount  expended  up  to  December, 
1863,  at  prices  on  the  basis  originally  assumed  by  Mr.  Brooks. 
We  have  then,  (taken  from  first  report,  p.  57)  : — 

Advances  made, . 8968,862  00 

Interest  for  eight  years,  .  .  *  .  .  462,585  00 

Expended  in  1863,  .  .  .  .  .  207,741  00 

Interest  compounded,  seven  years  at  5  per  cent.,  88,000  00 

- : - 

Amount  expended  to  December,  1864,  .  .  81,727,188  00 


Deducting  this  sum  from  the  amount  of  Mr.  Brooks’  original 
estimates,  85,719,330,  and  we  have  83,992,142  as  the  cost  of 
completing  the  work  from  December  1,  1864,  on  the  original 
basis  of  cost  of  labor  and  materials.  At  double  the  original 
estimate  for  labor  and  materials,  the  cost  would  be  87,984,282. 

But  Mr.  Brooks  reckons  interest  at  five  per  cent.  The  rate 
for  two  years  on  our  scrip,  on  account  of  the  premium  on  gold, 
has  varied  from  seven  to  twelve  per  cent.  Hereafter  we  cannot 
expect  to  borrow  a  dollar  for  less  than  six  per  cent.  This  will 
add,  at  least,  another  hundred  thousand  dollars  to  the  estimate. 

How  much  shall  be  added  for  the  additional  time  which  will 
be  necessary  to  complete  it  ?  Three  years  of  the  eight  which 
Mr.  Brooks  allowed  for  completion,  have  already  gone,  and  not 
one-tenth  of  the  work  is  done.  How  many  years  ?  Three  ? 
five  ?  ten  ?  No  sane  man  believes  it  will  be  completed  in  less 
than  ten  years  from  this  time.  This  adds  interest  for  five 
years  ;  say,  (I  will  not  stop  to  compute  it,)  a  million  of  dollars. 

How  much  shall  be  added  for  the  cost  of  tunnelling  the 
demoralized  rock  ?  Two  ?  three  ?  six  millions  ?  The  margin 
is  very  wide.  Call  it  three  millions.  We  then  have  the  follow¬ 
ing  as  the  cost  of  the  whole  work  from  its  assumption  by  the 
State : — 


Cost  to  December,  1864,  . 

Mr.  Brooks’  estimate  from  that  date, 

Extra  interest,  ...... 

Interest  on  above  for  additional  five  years, 
Demoralized  rock,  .  .  . 

Interest  on  last  item,  averaging  five  years, 
compounded  at  six  per  cent., 


81,727,188  00 
3,992,142  00 
100,000  00 
1,000,000  00 
3,000,000  00 

1,012,600  00 


Total  cost,  . 


.810,831,930  00 


40 


Now,  I  am  well  aware  to  liow  large  an  extent  such  estimates 
must  be  conjectural ;  but  I  challenge  exception  to  any  of  these 
items  as  extravagant.  We  do  know  this,  that  hitherto  actual 
results  have  exhibited  a  cost  very  largely  exceeding  the  esti¬ 
mates.  I  say  further,  that  not  an  unbiassed  and  competent 
engineer  can  be  found  who  will  not  give  it  as  his  judgment  that 
the  cost  will  far  exceed  these  estimates  rather  than  fall  short 
at  all ;  and  I  know,  still  further,  that  no  responsible  contrac¬ 
tors  .can  be  found  who  will  guarantee  to  complete  the  work  for 
this  sum ;  and  that,  after  all,  is  the  best  practical  test  of  the 
cost. 

We  come  now  to  the  great  question — 

What  is  to  be  done  ? 

The  State  has  expended  thus  far, — 


Advances  to  January,  1863,  and  interest, 
Expended  in  1863  and  1864, 

Expended  in  1865,  .... 


$1,431,447  00 
415,483  00 
477,142  00 


Total  to  December,  1865, 


$2,324,072  00 


If  we  stop  now,  we  sink  all  this,  except  what  the  machines 
would  sell  for. 


The  cost  of  machinery  has  been, — 


In  1863  and  1864,  .  . 

... 

$252,917  00 

In  1865,  .... 

This  might  be  sold,  perhaps 

,  as  follows  : 

241,600  00 

$494,517  00 

Deerfield  Dam,  . 

. 

$10,000  00 

Machinery,  say  20  per  cent,  on 

cost,  $484,517, 

96,900  00 

Iron  on  hand,  say, 

. 

250,000  00 

Tunnel  effects  in  liquidation, 

... 

$356,900  00 

41 


Deducting  this  sum  from  total  cost  to  December,  1865,  and 
we  have  $1,947,172  as  the  loss  which  the  State  must  pocket,  if 
we  stop  now. 

Will  it  pay  to  go  on  ?  Let  bygones  be  bygones ;  is  it  better 
to  sink  what  we  have  spent,  or  to  send  new  dollars  enough 
after  the  old  ones  to  finish  the  job  ?  I  have  made  the 

Total  estimate  of  cost,  ....  $10,881,930  00 

Expended  up  to  this  time,  ....  2,324,072  00 

Cost  of  completing,  on  this  estimate,  .  .  $8,507,858  00 

We  come  then  to  the  practical  question  :  Is  the  Tunnel  worth 
completing  at  a  cost  of  eight  and  a  half  millions  of  dollars  ? 

This  question  is  to  be  viewed  in  two  aspects :  First,  Will  it 
pay  in  the  additional  facility  it  gives  for  business  with  the  West, 
thus  indirectly  increasing  the  wealth  of  the  State  ?  Second, 
Will  the  traffic  pay  for  the  investment?  These  questions 
are  so  closely  related  that  they  will,  to  some  extent,  be 
considered  together. 

The  Indirect  Advantages. 

Will  the  additional  facilities  which  the  tunnel  route 
will  give  to  the  business  of  the  West  with  Massachusetts, 
justify  its  completion  ?  At  the  start  we  throw  out  the 
through  passenger  traffic ;  for  Mr.  Brooks  admits,  in  his 
first  report,  that  “  the  Western  road  will  take  the  greater 
part  of  the  through  Boston  passengers,”  though  lie  thinks  the 
Tunnel  route  will  divide  the  Saratoga  pleasure-passengers  with 
the  Western  Railroad.  He  says,  “  If  no  bridge  should  be  built 
at  Albany,  and  if  no  change  of  cars  be  required  on  the  Tunnel 
route  east  of  Schenectady,  the  physical  advantages  of  the 
routes,  so  far  as  time  is  concerned,  may  be  considered  as  nearly 
balanced.”  But  the  bridge  at  Albany  is  built,  and  though,  of 
course,  it  will  not  be  impracticable  to  arrange  for  running 
through  from  Schenectady  to  Boston  without  change  of  cars, 
no  man  knows  better  than  Mr.  Brooks  that  the  practical 
difficulties  of  making  such  an  arrangement  are  quite  serious. 
Between  Schenectady  and  Boston,  by  the  Tunnel  route,  there 
are  five  different  railroad  corporations  :  the  Schenectady  and 
6 


42 


Troy,  the  Troy  and  Boston,  (both  in  New  York,)  the 
Troy  and  Greenfield,  (or  the  tunnel,  owned  by  the  State,) 
the  Yermont  and  Massachusetts,  and  the  Fitchburg.  Between 
Albany  and  Boston  there  are  two,  soon  to  be  united 
in  one.  He  admits  that  the  advantage  which  the  Western  road 
has  of  a  double  track  all  the  way,  “  will  more  than  compensate 
for  the  difference  in  length,  which  must  be  computed  from 
Schenectady,  where  it  is  hut  five  miles.”  He  concedes  another 
great  advantage  to  the  Western  road.  “  The  travel  between 
Springfield  and  Boston  is  very  large  ;  this,  added  to  the  New 
York  travel  through  that  city,  renders  it  profitable  to  run  two, 
and  sometimes  three  express  passenger  trains  per  day.  By 
taking  the  western  passengers  on  these  trains,  they  are  enabled, 
without  any  extra  expense,  to  give  them  great  dispatch  over 
this  half  of  their  line.  ”  He  is  therefore  forced  to  admit  that 
“  the  Western  road  will  command  the  greater  part  of  the 
through  Boston  passengers.’’  We  dismiss,  therefore,  the 
passenger  traffic  from  constituting  an  element  of  the  exigency 
for  another  route  to  the  West. 

We  come,  then,  to  the 

Freight  Traffic. 

After  examining  other  routes,  Mr.  Brooks  admits  that  “  the 
Boston  and  Albany  road  is  the  best  freight  line  between  Boston 
and  the  West,  and  it  is  with  this  that  the  tunnel  route  should 
be  compared.  ” 

The  Comparative  Length  of  the  Routes. 

It  seems  to  have  been  taken  for  granted  that  there  is  a  large 
saving  in  distance  by  the  Tunnel  route,  over  the  Western.  As 
a  specimen  of  these  disingenuous — I  will  not  say  dishonest — 
attempts  to  mystify  the  public  on  this  point,  look  at  a  table  of 
distances  given  by  Hon.  Alvali  Crocker,  in  a  speech  in  the 
Senate  in  1862.  True,  he  states  that  it  is  “  a  table. of  distances 
from  Troy ;  ”  but  the  table  is  got  up  to  show  the  advantage  of 
the  Tunnel  route  over  the  Western,  and  the  design  is  to  give 
the  impression  that  it  is  a  fair  statement  of  the  relative  merits 
of  the  two  routes  in  this  respect.  Otherwise,  the  table  has  no 
meaning.  Thus  he  gives  the  distance  “  to  Boston,  via  Western 
railroad,  208  miles ;  ”  “  via  Troy  and  Greenfield,  189  miles.” 


43 


Most  people  would  understand  this  to  mean  that  Boston  is 
nineteen  miles  nearer  to  the  West  by  the  Tunnel  route  than  by 
the  Western.  The  rest  of  his  table  is  equally  deceptive,  or 
more  so. ' 

Now,  the  competing  point  is  Schenectady.  All  the  through 
traffic  for  both  these  routes  comes  to  that  point.  Thence  it  is 
brought  either  by  the  New  York  Central  road  to  Albany,  for 
the  Western  road,  or  by  the  local  roads  there  diverging  to 
Troy,  for  the  Tunnel  route.  The  distances  from  Schenectady 
to  Boston  are, 

From  Boston  to  Schenectady,  by  Tunnel  line,  .  212  miles. 
From  Boston  to  Schenectady,  by  Western  line,  .  217  miles. 

The  difference  in  the  length  of  the  lines  is  thus  conceded  to 
be  five  miles.  This  is  more  than  offset  by  the  difference  between 
the  distance  of  the  Western  Railroad  freight  depot  and 
the  centre  of  business  in  Boston,  and  that  of  the  Fitchburg 
freight  depot  and  the  same  centre,  with  the  inconvenience  to 
the  Fitchburg  freight  of  the  intervening  drawbridge.  Add  to 
this  the  consideration  that  the  growth  of  Boston  must  be  east 
and  south  of  the  Western  depot,  bringing  that  still  nearer  the 
centre  of  business.  Now,  though  a  truckman,  in  making  a 
contract  to  carry  miscellaneous  freight  to  and  from  all  the 
railroads  in  Boston,  might  not  make  any  difference  when  the 
Fitchburg  freight  forms  a  very  inconsiderable  portion  of  the 
whole,  yet  when  we  are  talking  about  hundreds  of  thousands  of 
tons,  these  considerations  form  quite  a  material  element.  For 
all  practical  purposes,  then,  the  distances  between  Boston  and 
Schenectady,  by  the  two  routes,  may  be  considered  equal. 

Engineering  Characteristics  of  the  Routes. 

The  principal  stock  in  trade  of  the  tunnellites  has  been  the 
alleged  superiority  of  the  Tunnel  route  over  the  Western,  in 
the  matter  of  grades.  (They  keep  wisely  silent  about  the 
curvature.)  So  noisy  and  so  persistent  has  been  the  clamor, 
that  the  public  has  come  almost  to  believe  that  the  high  grades 
on  the  Western'  road  presented  an  insurmountable  barrier  to 
their  transporting  the  Western  freight  which  is  seeking  an 
avenue  to  Boston.  Mr.  Crocker  says,  in  the  speech  before 


44 


referred  to,  “  assuming  grade  and  curvature  to  govern  the 
maximum  load  of  a  train,  it  is  believed  that  an  ordinary  freight 
engine  of  twenty-four  tons  will  draw  fifteen  hundred  barrels  of 
flour  on  the  Tunnel  line  with  the  same  facility  as  eight  hundred 
upon  the  Western !  ”  It  is  by  such  preposterous  statements, 
made  by  men  whom  the  community  are  accustomed  to  believe 
in  other  matters,  that  the  exigency  for  another  railroad  to  the 
West  has  come  to  be  regarded  as  proved.  And  yet  it  is  just 
such  men  as  Mr.  Crocker  that  the  tunnel  interest  sends  to  the 
general  court  to  enlighten  the  legislative  mind  upon  grave 
questions  of  public  policy,  and  they  talk  to  me  of  “  tunnel  on 
the  brain.  ”  I  do  not  impugn  their  general  honesty  or  common 
sense  ;  but  any  statements  coming  from  such  partisans  are  enti¬ 
tled  to  just  as  much  credit  as  were  the  vagaries  of  honest  old 
Gabriel  Thompson  upon  the  quadrature  of  the  circle. 

Mr.  Brooks,  in  his  first  report,  makes  the  best  case  he  can  in 
favor  of  the  tunnel  as  a  freight  line,  and  his  figures  differ  very 
widely  from  Mr.  Crocker’s.  He  says :  “  It  has  been  found  that 
the  locomotive  which  would  haul  an  average  of  86j8q7q-  tons 
upon  the  Western  Railroad  route,  would  take  102  tons,  or 
17^q  per  cent,  more,  upon  the  Tunnel  route.”  On  this  basis, 
Mr.  Crocker’s  engine,  which  would  take  1,500  barrels  of  flour 
over  the  Tunnel  route,  would  take  1,277  barrels,  instead  of 
800,  over  the  Western  road.  So  widely  do  doctors  disagree. 

After  the  statement  in  the  extract  above  quoted  from  Mr. 
Brooks’  report,  he  goes  on  to  say  :  “  A  net  saving  is  therefore 
made  of  28  per  cent,  of  17t4q  per  cent.,  or  about  5  per  cent,  of 
the  total  cost  of  transportation,  by  reason  of  the  easier  con¬ 
trolling  grades  of  the  Tunnel  route.”  He  then  says,  “  This, 
represented  by  miles,  would  reduce  the  distance  from  189  to 
179^  miles,  or  say  180  miles,”  (he  is  very  liberal  in  throwing 
in  this  half  mile,  especially  when  he  had  put  the  distance 
to  Troy  a  mile  and  a  half  less  than  he  had  elsewhere  stated 
it  to  be,)  “  and  reduce  the  general  cost  of  transportation 
between  Boston  and  the  Hudson  River  ten  per  cent.”  Now,  it 
does  not  follow  that,  because  the  distance  is  ten  per  cent, 
less,  the  cost  of  freight  will  be  ten  per  cent,  less*  for 
everybody  knows  that  the  longer  the  line,  the*  less,  relatively, 
as  compared  with  a  shorter  line,  will  be  the  cost  of  carrying 
through  freight.  Again,  in  order  to  secure  his  ten  per  cent. 


45 


saving,  he  is  obliged  to  assume  that  the  New  York  Central 
Boad  will  always  deliver  freight  at  Troy,  four  miles  further,  at 
the  same  rates  as  at  Albany  ;  and  he  argues  that  “  even  should 
a  bridge  be  built  across  the  river  at  Albany,  it  will  probably  be 
as  cheap  for  that  company  to  send  a  part  of  its  business  to 
Troy,  as  to  incur  the  inconvenience  of  passing  it  through  the 
crowded  Albany  terminus.”  And  he  supposes  anybody  will 
believe  this,  when,  with  the  bridge  built,  there  will  be  a  con¬ 
tinuous  track  from  Buffalo  to  Boston,  and  Albany  is  no  more 
the  terminus  for  through  freight  than  is  Schenectady,  or  Utica, 
or  any  other  point  on  the  line.  Besides,  as  I  have  shown,  the 
inconvenience  of  diverging,  at  Schenectady,  from  the  natural 
line  of  traffic,  and  passing  four  miles  further  over  a  local  road, 
and  the  increased  distance  of  the  Fitchburg  freight  depot  from 
the  centre  of  business  i$  Boston,  more  than  compensate  for  the 
difference  in  length  between  the  Tunnel  and  the  Western 
routes.  However,  for  present  purposes,  it  is  not  necessary  to 
split  hairs,  and  the  results  will  show  that  we  can  afford  to  be 
liberal.  We  will  therefore  proceed  upon  the  basis  that  the 
Tunnel  route  will  save  ten  per  cent,  of  the  cost  of  trans¬ 
portation. 

Mr.  Brooks,  in  his  first  report,  (pp.  82-85)  states  his  claim 
for  the  amount  of  through  freight  business  for  the  Tunnel 
route  at  its  opening  at  the  end  of  eight  years.  The  basis  of  his 
whole  estimate  is  a  “  statement  (on  page  82)  of  the  freight 
business  between  Albany,  Boston  and  Brighton,  from  1843  to 
1862,  inclusive.”  Pray,  what  has  he  to  do  with  the  freight 
between  Boston,  Albany  and  Brighton,  in  estimating  the  traffic 
for  the  Tunnel  route  ?  He  might  as  well  have  got  up  a  table 
of  freight  between  Boston,  Albany  and  Springfield.  Not  a  ton 
of  freight  between  the  West  and  Brighton  will  pass  over  the 
Tunnel  route  ;  and  no  man  knows  this  better  than  Mr.  Brooks. 
The  statement  is  of  the  same  character  as  the  rest  of  the  Tun¬ 
nel  statistics — thoroughly  dishonest,  and  intended  to  deceive. 
Adopting  the  false  data  of  this  table,  Mr.  Brooks,  on  page 
84,  boldly  states  the  following  : 

“  Boston  and  Albany  through  freight  for  1862  was  176,805 
tons.”  He  knew  that  that  included  all  the  live  stock  to 
Brighton,  for  he  had  before  him  the  returns  of  the  Western 


46 


Railroad  for  1862,  which 
as  follows — 

From  Boston  to  Albany,  . 
From  Albany  to  Boston,  . 

Total, 


gave  the  actual  through  freight 


.  22,785  tons. 

.  118,040  “ 


.  135,825  tons, 


instead  of  176,805  tons,  as  he  states  it.  He  included  41,000 
tons  of  Brighton  local  freight  as  through  freight  to  Boston.  I 
fully  believe,  at  least  I  devoutly  hope,  that  no  such  discredita¬ 
ble  deception  can  be  found  in  any  other  public  document  in 
Massachusetts. 

The  result  is  still  more  deceptive  when  the  receipts  for  this 
Brighton  freight  are  included  in  the  item  of  receipts  for  through 
freight ;  as  the  freight  on  live  stock  is  myicli  larger  per  ton  than 
on  any  other  class  of  freight. 

This  error  vitiates  his  whole  calculation  ;  for  he  makes  it  the 
basis  of  his  estimate  of  the  traffic  of  other  connecting  lines. 
In  correcting  his  table,  I  will,  however,  deduct  only  the 
Brighton  freight,  and  his  table  on  page  84  will  stand  as  follows  : 


Boston  and  Albany  through  freight  for  1862,  .  185,825  tons. 

Freight  of  competing  lines,  ....  103,258  “ 


Total,  .  .  .  . 

Add  60  per  cent,  for  increase,  . 


239,083  tons. 
143,450  “ 


Total  8  years  hence,  . 


382,533  tons. 


The  Tunnel  line  he  claims  one-third  of  this, 
And  receive  for  through  freight, 

Which  would  be,  per  mile, 


127,511  tons. 
1438,383  00 
2,295  00 


•  In  this  table,  Mr.  Brooks  figures  for  189  miles  as  the  length 
of  his  road ;  I  have  figured  on  its  true  length,  191  miles,  as 
Mr.  Brooks  elsewhere  makes  it.  Giving  to  the  Tunnel  the 
proportion  which  belongs  to  its  43f  miles,  and  we  have 
$100,223.00  as  the  gross  earnings  for  through  freight  the  first 
year  of  its  working. 

We  will  now  examine  Mr.  Brooks’  table  of  “  Estimated 
Earnings”  on  page  95  of  his  first  report.  For  the  local 


47 

business,  this  is  based  on  calculations  made  on  pages  65,  66 
and  67.  As  a  curiosity,  I  copy  a  part  of  this  table. 


Estimated  Earnings. 

From  local  passengers,  #1,382.00  per  mile  for  44 

miles, . #60,808  00 

From  local  freight,  #2,140  per  mile  for  44  miles,  94,160  00 

From  through  passengers,  #400.00  per  mile  for 

44  miles,  .  . .  17,600  00 

From  through  freight,  #2,716.00  per  mile  for  44 

miles, .  119,504  00 

Mails  and  express,  &c., .  10,000  00 


Total  earnings  on  line,  ....  #302,072  00 
Deduct  55  per  cent,  for  operating  expenses,  .  166,139  00 


Net  earned  on  road,  .....  #135,933  00 

Now,  on  page  65,  Mr.  Brooks  has  a  statement  made  to  a 
committee  of  the  legislature  in  1861,  giving  the  entire  receipts 
for  a  year,  for  freight  and  passengers,  on  the  line  between 
Greenfield  and  North  Adams.  Everybody  knows  that  these 
estimates  are  always  put  up  to  the  utmost  limit  of  truth.  The 
total  receipts  are  #41,911.00,  and  this,  too,  at  prices  more  than 
double  railroad  rates.  Fifteen  thousand  dollars  would  be  a 
large  figure  for  this  traffic  on  the  railroad.  And  yet  Mr. 
Brooks  claims  from  this  local  traffic,  the  first  year  the  tunnel 
opens ,  #154,968.00  !  How  does  Mr.  Brooks  figure  this  ?  He 
says,  (p.  67,) 

“  The  local  business  of  the  Western  Railroad,  between  Springfield 
and  Albany,  for  the  year  ending  November  30,  1861,  was, — 

For  local  passengers, . $1,589  00  per  mile. 

For  local  freight, .  2,460  00  “  “ 

“  Estimating  that  for  the  Troy  and  Greenfield  at  87  per  cent,  of  this, 
it  will  be,— 

For  local  passengers,  .  .  .  .  $1,382  00  per  mile. 

For  local  freight, .  2,140  00  per  mile.” 


48 


That  is,  the  Tunnel  line  will  have,  between  Greenfield  and 
Troy,  the  first  year  it  is  opened ,  87  per  cent,  of  the  same 
amount  of  business  that  the  Western  Railroad  has  between 
Springfield  and  Albany,  after  having  been  twenty  years  devel¬ 
oping  the  resources  of  its  line !  The  whole  argument  under 
the  head  of  “  earnings  ”  is  thoroughly  illogical,  Jesuitical  and 
insulting  to  the  intelligence  of  the  legislature  to  which  it  was 
addressed.  Talk  of  the  undeveloped  water-power  on  this 
line  !  Why,  there  is  ten  times  more  unemployed  water-power 
between  Westfield  and  Pittsfield,  within  twenty  rods  of  the  line 
of  a  railroad  which  has  been  “  developing  ”  this  power  for 
twenty  years,  than  there  is  on  the  entire  Tunnel  line  between 
Deerfield  and  North  Adams. 

Let  us  return  to  Mr.  Brooks’  table  of  “  estimated  earnings.” 
We  have  seen  that  he  claimed  for  through  freight,  “  12,716.00 
per  mile  for  44  miles,  1119,504.00.”  But  deducting  Brighton 
freight,  he  is  entitled,  on  this  basis,  to  12,295.00  per  mile  s 
total,  $100,980.00.  This  amount,  deducted  from  $119,504.00, 
gives  $18,524.00  as  the  amount  of  Mr.  Brooks’  over  claim  for 
the  Brighton  freight.  Deducting  this  from  Mr.  Brooks’  gross 
earnings,  $802,072.00,  and  we  have  $283,548.00  as  the  gross 
earnings.  Deducting  55  per  cent,  of  this  for  working  expenses, 
($155,951.00,)  and  we  have  $127,597.00  as  the  net  earnings 
he  claims.  This  is  2T2F  per  cent,  on  the  whole  estimated  cost 
of  the  road,  $5,719,330.00,  or  2t9q  per  cent,  on  $4,287,883.00, 
which  he  estimated  it  would  then  cost  to  finish  the  road.  And 
this  is  the  best  result  Mr.  Brooks  can  conjure  out  of  his 
extravagant  estimates  of  the  traffic. 

How,  then,  does  Mr.  Brooks  foot  up  a  remunerating  income  ? 
He  rests  in  a  contract  by  which  the  Troy  and  Boston,  the 
Vermont  and  Massachusetts,  and  the  Fitchburg  Railroad 
Companies  agree  to  pay  to  the  State  of  Massachusetts  one-fifth 
of  the  gross  receipts  from  all  their  freight  and  passenger  traffic 
which  passes  over  any  part  of  the  Troy  and  Greenfield  Railroad, 
until  the  tunnel  earns  six  per  cent,  net  on  its  final  cost !  To 
this  humiliation  has  Mr.  Brooks  reduced  the  State  of  Massa¬ 
chusetts.  He  must  get  the  tunnel  built ;  he  must  commit  the 
State  to  the  work  ;  he  knew  it  would  not  pay  ;  and  he  applies 
to  the  soulless  corporations  which  the  State  created,  to  keep 


49 


the  State  out  of  the  folly  into  which  he  was  determined  to 
plunge  her. 

Let  us  see  what  these  corporations  have  agreed  to  do. 
Suppose  their  gross  receipts  in  a  given  traffic  are  $1,000. 
Fifty-five  per  cent,  of  this  goes  to  working  expenses,  leaving 
$450  as  their  net  earnings.  Twenty  per  cent,  of  the  gross 
sum,  that  is,  $200,  goes  to  the  State  of  Massachusetts ; 
leaving  $250  as  their  net  earnings  on  this  traffic.  And  this 
contract  is  made  by  one  road  which  pays  no  dividends  and  has 
no  surplus  ;  which  has  not  added  a  dollar  to  its  equipment  for 
I  don’t  know  how  many  years  ;  and  whose  stock  is  selling  at 
forty  cents  on  the  dollar ;  and  they  thus  fling  away  nearly  one- 
lialf  of  the  net  profits  of  their  whole  through  traffic  until  the 
tunnel  pays  six  per  cent,  on  its  cost,  from  the  profits  of  its 
legitimate  business ;  that  is,  for  all  time.  Is  anybody  so 
verdant  as  to  suppose  such  a  contract  will  be  kept  ?  Does 
anybody  think  so  meanly  of  Massachusetts  as  to  suppose  she 
would  ever  attempt  to  enforce  it  ?  Nobody  but  Mr.  Brooks. 
He,  it  is  understood,  chuckles  over  it  as  the  smartest  act  of  his 
life. 

A  rich  English  railway  contractor  was  asked  how  he  made  so 
much  money,  while  others  were  ruined.  “Oh,  I  never  sign 
a  contract  until  my  lawyer  assures  me  there  is  a  loophole  !  ” 
There  will  be  loopholes  found  in  this  contract  bigger  than  the 
Hoosac  bore. 

But  admitting  that  this  contract  will  be  fulfilled  ;  what  does 
Mr.  Brooks  figure  up  for  net  income  ?  He  claims, — 

“  Net  earnings  of  his  road,  ....  $135,933  00 
Receivable  under  contract  with  other  roads,  .  124,336  00 

Total  net  earnings  and  receipts,  .  .  .  $260,269  00 

This  is  4t5q5£-  per  cent,  on  the  whole  estimated  capital  and 
interest  of  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  $5,719,330  00 

It  is  6t  per  cent,  upon  the  estimated  capital 
and  interest  required  to  complete  the  road  and 
tunnel,  which  is . $4,287,833  00.” 

Remember,  nearly  half  of  his  net  income  is  to  come  from 
this  contract ;  if  this  fails,  where  is  his  income?  Again,  he 
puts  the  cost  of  completing  at  $4,287,833  ;  I  think  I  have 
7 


50 


shown  that  it  must  cost  double  that ;  and  it  may  cost  four 
times  that.  Where,  then,  will  be  his  income  ? 

The  truth  is,  the  attempt  to  prove  that  this  concern  will  ever 
produce  a  remunerating  income,  is  thoroughly  dishonest.  If 
Mr.  Brooks  believed  it,  he  would  put  his  own  money  into  it ; 
the  blatant  advocates  of  the  enterprise  would  invest  theirs  in 
it.  They  know  better.  For  ten  or  fifteen  years  these  disinter¬ 
ested  gentlemen  have  exhausted  their  powers  in  trying  to 
induce  others  to  invest  in  this  thing.  Boston  capitalists  were 
deluged  with  statistics  ;  but  no  subscriptions  were  forthcoming. 
Frantic  appeals  were  made  to  individuals  and  towns  on  the 
line,  the  result  of  which  was  quite  a  number  of  subscriptions 
from  men  of  small  means,  with  but  very  few,  (and  those  very  , 
small,)  from  the  wealthy  ;  the  general  rule  being  that,  the 
larger  the  subscriptions,  the  smaller  the  percentage  paid  in. 
The  rich  ones  and  the  knowing  ones  were  shy.  Through  the 
press,  in  the  legislature,  on  the  stump,  they  urged  others  to 
“  go  in.  ”  “  They  bind  heavy  burdens  and  grievous  to  be 

borne,  and  lay  them  on  men’s  shoulders,  but  they  themselves 
will  not  move  them  with  one  of  their  fingers.  ” 

They  inveigled  many  a  hard-earned  fifty  or  hundred  dollars 
out  of  the  farmers  ;  but  where  are  their  own  thousands  ? 
Let  us  look  at  some  names  on  the  list  of  subscriptions. 


Number  of 

Shares. 

Paid  in. 

D.  N.  Carpenter, . 

30 

$780  00 

Otis  Clapp,  “  services,  ” . 

2 

200  00 

Alvah  Crocker,  “  services,  ”  . 

15 

1,500  00 

George  T.  Davis, . 

20 

460  00 

W.  T.  Davis, . 

20 

430  00 

H.  L.  Dawes, . 

27 

135  00 

E.  fj.  Derby,  “  services,  ”  .... 

1 

100  00 

W.  T.  Davis, . 

10 

000  00 

Whiting  Griswold, . 

5 

60  00 

John  W.  Griswold,  (Troy,)  .... 

1 

80  00 

Lamson,  Goodnow  &  Co., . 

50 

2,275  00 

u  u  « 

50 

000  00 

George  Millard,  .  ; 

11 

1,100  00 

H.  Smith,  .  .  . 

2 

190  00 

E.  R.  Tinker,  ....... 

2 

120  00 

Daniel  S.  Richardson, . 

0! 

00  00! 

Total, . 

246 

$7,430  00 

51 


Of  the  sum  actually  paid  in,  $1,800  is  put  down  as  paid 
in  “  services,”  leaving  $5,630  paid  in  cash.  I  presume  that 
Messrs.  Lamson,  Goodnow  &  Co.  paid  their  assessments  in  land 
damages,  as  they  settled  with  Mr.  Brooks  for  $3,000  in  that 
way  ;  and  that  Messrs.  George  T.  and  W.  T.  Davis,  and  D. 
N.  Carpenter,  paid  theirs  also  in  “  services.”  But  letting  these 
stand  as  cash  payments,  and  we  have  the  pitiful  sum  of  $5,630 
as  the  contribution  of  the  leaders  to  this  great  enterprise.  For 
this  list  comprises  the  names  of  the  men  who  have  “  run  this 
machine”  for  the  last  fifteen  years.  Look  at  them.  E.  H. 
Derby,  president  of  the  Fitchburg  Railroad — a  road  which 
would  derive  immense  benefit  from  the  completion  of  the 
•  tunnel ;  who  poured  out  such  streams  of  honeyed  eloquence  to 
persuade  others  into  investment, — he  risked  $100  in  “  services.” 
Otis  Clapp,  the  only  Boston  “  capitalist  ”  on  the  list,  who  has 
got  up  volumes  of  statistics  to  prove  the  profitableness  of 
the  investment — he  invested  $200  in  “  services.”  Alvah 
Crocker,  the  Ajax  Telamon  of  the  enterprise,  who,  in  addition 
to  his  other  herculean  labors,  has  neglected  his  private  interests 
for  I  don’t  know  how  many  winters,  and  labored  as  a  lobby 
member,  and  even  submitted  to  the  sacrifice  of  accepting 
repeatedly  a  seat  in  the  Senate  ;  with  large  investments  in  the 
Fitchburg  Railroad  to  be  doubled  in  value  by  the  success  of 
this  work — he  contributed  $1,500  in  “services!”  Whiting 
Griswold  has  devoted  the  vigorous  powers  of  ingenuous  youth 
to  this  great  work,  and  has  shown  his  faith  in  its  success 
by  contributing — $60 !  in  “  services  ”  ?  These  last  two 
gentlemen  have  done  more  than  all  others  combined,  in 
saddling  this  load  upon  the  State,  and  their  joint  contribu¬ 
tions  in  cash  are  $60!  John  W.  Griswold,  (I  suppose  this 
means  John  A. ;  if  not,  he  subscribed  nothing !)  of  Troy — a 
city  which  is  to  surpass  its  rival,  Albany,  when  this  road  is 
opened — at  the  head  of  the  Iron  Company,  which  received 
seventy  odd  thousand  dollars  from  the  State  treasury  in 
payment  for  iron  sold  to  Mr.  Haupt,  and  which  the  State  had 
once  paid  for — he  paid  $80.  Surely,  it  requires  more  than 
the  exercise  of  the  charity  which  believeth  all  things,  to  give 
to  these  gentlemen  the  slightest  credit  for  sincerity  in  their 
noisy  professions  of  faith  in  the  pecuniary  results  of  this 
enterprise. 


52 


But,  waiving  all  considerations  of  dividends,  will  the  great 
indirect  advantages  of  the  tunnel  route,  in  opening  another 
avenue  for  Western  trade,  justify  the  State  in  prosecuting  the 
work  ? 

One  important  question  in  considering  this  matter,  is — Will 
the  tunnel  route  open  a  new  traffic  ?  Will  it  tap  the  West  at 
a  different  point  from  existing  routes  ?  If  it  established  a 
better  connection  with  the  Erie  Railroad  than  now  exists,  or 
with  the  traffic  which  reaches  the  seaboard  by  way  of  Lake 
Ontario,  it  would  be  a  great  point  in  its  favor.  But, 
confessedly,  it  does  nothing  of  the  kind.  It  simply  goes  to 
Schenectady,  and  then  asks  the  New  York  Central  road  for  a 
share  in  the  traffic  which  otherwise  would  come  to  Albany,  f 
and  such  portion  of  it  as  the  Western  Railroad  could  accommo¬ 
date,  to  Boston.  Clearly,  then,  the  tunnel  can  make,  no 
pretensions  that  it  will  bring  an  additional  ton  of  Western 
freight  to  Boston,  provided  the  Western  road  has  capabilities 
for  bringing  all  that  offers. 

In  dealing  with  this  matter,  we  are  to  consider  only  the 
question  whether  the  Western  road  is  capable  of  bringing 
eastward ,  from  Albany,  all  the  traffic  that  seeks  Boston. 
Within  the  last  five  years,  that  road  has  carried  130,000  tons 
of  through  freight,  and  700,000  tons  of  local  freight  westward, 
and  it  has  brought  532,000  tons  of  through  freight,  and 
1,700,000  tons  of  local  freight,  eastward.  These  figures  show 
that  it  can  fully  accommodate  all  westward-bound  freight. 
We  come  then  to  the  pivotal  question  ? 

What  are  the  Capabilities  of  the  Western  Railroad  for 
Eastward-bound  Freight  ? 

I  shall  not  waste  time  in  repelling  the  charge  that  I  write 
in  the  interests  of  the  Western  Railroad.  I  have  not  spoken 
to  the  president  of  that  road  since  I  met  him  in  the  Constitu¬ 
tional  Convention  in  1852  until  five  months  ago,  when  I  met 
him  and  was  introduced  to  him  in  the  cars.  I  never  saw  the 
superintendent  until  within  four  months,  when  I  had  occasion 
to  call  at  his  office  to  inquire  whether  I  would  be  sure  of  fifteen 
minutes  before  the  Albany  train  started  eastward.  I  never 
knew  the  attorney  of  the  road  until  he  was  appointed  supreme 
judge  ;  and  I  never  had  any  communication  or  correspondence 


53 


with  any  of  these  gentlemen  or  with  any  person  connected  with 
the  road,  (except  that  I  applied  for  and  received  within  ten 
days  some  statistics  of  traffic,)  except  once  or  twice  to  complain 
of  misconduct  on  the  part  of  their  employees.  I  have  never 
received  a  dollar,  directly  or  indirectly,  from  any  person  con¬ 
nected  with  the  road  towards  the  expenses  I  have  incurred  in 
“  fighting  the  tunnel,”  or  for  any  purpose  whatever,  except, 
(if  it  be  an  exception)  half  a  dozen  free  passes  from  personal 
friends.  I  would  not  refer  to  this,  were  it  not  for  the  shame¬ 
less  insinuations  freely  circulated  by  men  who  are  incapable 
of  conceiving  that  any  man  can  perform  a  public  duty  from 
any  but  mercenary  motives. 

What  are  the  capabilities  of  the  Western  Railroad  for  traffic 
eastward  from  Albany  ?  In  1864  it  brought  the  largest  amount 
of  through  freight  ever  brought  to  Boston  in  one  year,  116,974 
tons  ;  in  1865,  87,254  tons.*  Now  I  am  not  considering  what 


♦The  following  is  among  the  statistics  referred  to  as  having  been  received 
from  Springfield  : 

To  the  inquiry  as  to  the  cause  for  the  falling  off  in  the  number  of  tons  of 
through  freight  in  1865,  as  compared  with  that  in  1864,  no  satisfactory  answer 
can  be  given.  In  the  item  of  flour,  however,  the  falling  off  is  especially  to  be 
seen.  Thus : 

In  1864,  number  of  bbls.  of  flour  carried  to  Boston  was  .  .  590,265  bbls. 

In  1865,  “  “  “  “  “  “  .  .  363,844  “ 


A  falling  off  of .  226,421  bbls. 

Or,  estimating  10  bbls  to  a  ton,  ....  22,642  tons. 
We  find  upon  inquiry,  that  the  New  York  Central  Railroad  brought  this  year 
to  tide  water  (viz  Albany  and  Troy)  over  800,000  bbls  of  flour  less  than  in 
1864.  Furthermore, 

The  Canal  brought  to  tide  water  in  1864,  .  .  •  1,190,000  bbls. 

“  “  “  “  1865,  .  .  .  1,014,600  “ 


Less  in  1865  than  1864,  ....  176,400  bbls. 

Add  to  this, 

Falling  off  on  the  New  York  Central,  ....  800,000  bbls. 

And  there  results, 

Less  in  1865  than  1864, .  975,400  bbls. 

The  following  figures  which  I  have  taken  from  the  Report  of  the  New  York 
Central  Railroad,  will  show  the  amount  of  their  freight  business  this  year  as 
compared  with  that  of  1864  : 


Tons  going 
West. 

Tons  going 

East. 

Tons 

Through. 

Tons  Way. 

1864,  . 

1865,  . 

412,986 

382,762 

1,144,162 

892,537 

766,569 

640,575 

790,579 

634,724 

Decrease,  .... 

30,224 

251,625 

126,094 

155,855 

54 


the  Western  Railroad  has  done  with  a  ferry  at  Albany,  with 
forty  miles  of  single  track,  with  its  present  equipment  and 
under  its  present  management ;  but  what  it  is  capable  of  doing 
with  a  bridge  over  the  Hudson,  with  a  double  track  all  the 
way,  and  under  a  management  fully  alive  to  the  duty  of 
making  available  the  highest  resources  of  modern  railroad 
science  and  of  meeting  the  commercial  exigencies  of  the  day. 

It  is  discreditable  that  our  great  thoroughfare  to  the  West  is 
still  hampered  in  its  resources  by  forty  miles  of  single  track. 
But  surely  the  State  which  owns  eleven  thousand  shares  of  the 
stock  and  holds  14,000,000  in  its  bonds,  and  has  four  directors 
on  its  Board,  must  share  the  responsibility  of  this  state  of  things 
with  the  directors  elected  by  the  stockholders.  At  any  rate, 
the  remedy  is  in  the  hands  of  the  State,  as  she  can  at  any 
moment  take  the  road  out  of  the  hands  of  the  corporation. 

A  million  of  dollars  will  lay  another  track  over  the  deficient 
section.  Another  million  expended  for  freight  locomotives  and 
cars  will  quadruple  its  capacity  for  through  freight.  Two  mil¬ 
lions  thus  expended  will  give  the  road  six  or  eight  times  its 
present  capacity.  With  a  double  track,  and  with  such  an 
equipment  there  is  hardly  a  limit  to  the  capabilities  of  a  rail¬ 
road.  Thus,  the  Pennsylvania  Railroad  is  to-day  taking 
freight  trains  of  two  hundred  and  forty  tons  each  over  its 
road  with  a  grade  of  95  feet  to  the  mile  for  fifteen  miles ; 
whereas,  the  maximum  grade  on  the  Western  road  eastward  is 
75^-  feet  to  the  mile  for  seven  miles.  This  load  of  240  tons  is 
the  gross  weight  of  cars  and  freight,  exclusive  of  engine  and 
tender.  Freight  cars,  well  filled  as  through  cars  always  are, 
constitute  something  less  than  fifty  per  cent,  of  the  gross 
weight  of  the  train.  This  will  give  something  over  fifty  per 
cent,  as  the  proportion  of  paying  freight.*  Calling  the  net 

*1  am  indebted  to  a  friend  for  the  following  statement : 

In  1864  for  each  ton  of  merchandise  carried  one  mile  the 
Boston  &  Lowell  Railroad  carried  in  weight  of  freight  cars  (as  esti¬ 


mated  per  Reports,) . 15  tons. 

Boston  &  Maine  Railroad, . 1.33  “ 

Boston  &  Providence  Railroad, . 1.5  “ 

Boston  &  Worcester  Railroad, . 138  “ 

Western  Railroad, .  1.398  “ 


Average, . .  .  .1.42  tons. 


That  is  to  say,  for  a  gross  load,  exclusive  of  engine  and  tender  of  100  tons, 
but  41.3  tons  of  paying  freight. 

When  the  cars  are  full,  as  to  weight,  100  tons  gross  load  would  contain  55.5 
tons  of  paying  freight,  showing  how  much  the  cost  of  motive  power  is  affected 
by  the  nature  of  the  traffic,  independently  of  the  profits  of  the  line. 


55 


freight  as  fifty  per  cent,  of  the  whole  load,  and  we  have  120 
tons  of  paying  freight  to  each  train.  On  a  double  track  road, 
with  double  the  number  of  passenger  trains  now  run  by  the 
Western  road,  freight  trains  can  be  run  every  twenty  minutes 
and  keep  out  of  the  way  of  passenger  trains.  We  will  esti¬ 
mate  for  a  freight  train  each  half  hour.  This  will  give  240 
tons  of  freight  per  hour,  5,760  tons  per  day,  and  1,797,120 
tons  in  the  year  of  812  working  days.  This  is  twenty  times 
the  amount  of  freight  brought  eastward  by  the  Western  road 
last  year.  Mr.  Brooks,  (First  Report,  p.  84,)  figures  the  total 
freight  from  the  West  to  Boston  eight  years  hence  at  448,101 
tons,  which  his  road  is  going  to  help  the  Western  road  to  bring. 
My  calculation  proves  that  the  Western  road  alone  can  bring 
1,797,120  tons — more  than  four  times  his  estimates  of  the 
whole  freight  eight  years  hence. 

But  this  calculation  assumes  that  freight  engines  are  used  of 
the  same  size,  or  but  a  trifle  larger  than  those  now  used  on  the 
Western  road  ;  whereas,  engines  are  now  built,  specially 
adapted  to  heavy  traffic,  which  will  carry  nearly  double  the  load 
above  stated.  The  introduction  of  them  would  increase  the 
capacity  of  the  Western  road  to  over  three  millions  of  tons 
eastward  annually.  Practically,  there  is  hardly  a  limit  to  the 
freighting  capabilities  of  a  double  track  road  with  adequate 
equipment. 

But  cavillers  may  say,  “  These  are  estimates  ;  give  us  results 
actually  accomplished.”  They  are  estimates ;  but  their  cor¬ 
rectness  cannot  be  disputed.  However,  here  are  facts.  The 
New  York  Central  road,  with  a  local  traffic  probably  three 
times  as  large  as  that  of  the  Western  Railroad,  brought  to 
Albany  last  year  600,000  tons  of  through  freight.  What 
hinders  the  Western  road,  with  double  track  and  fully  equip¬ 
ped,  bringing  the  same  amount  of  freight  to  Boston  ?  The 
Pennsylvania  railroad,  with  ninety-five  feet  grade,  carried 
147,978  tons  from  Philadelphia  to  Pittsburg,  and  from  Pitts¬ 
burg  to  Philadelphia  382,000  tons  up  lighter  grades.  These 
are  facts ;  and  what  this  road  can  do,  the  Western  can  do. 

But  the  old  bugbear  of  the  high  grade  on  the  Western  road. 
Of  course,  no  one  denies  that  the  Tunnel  line  has  this  advan¬ 
tage  ;  that  its  maximum  grade  going  east  is  52^-  feet,  while 
that  of  the  Western  is  75J  feet.  But  this  is  only  a  question  of 


56 


increased  cost  of  freight.  With  auxiliary  power  used  on  the 
five  miles  of  maximum  grade  near  Pittsfield,  this  disadvantage 
would  be  entirely  overcome.  With  this  overcome,  the  Western 
line  is  exactly  equal  as  to  grades,  (in  curves  it  has  the  advan¬ 
tage,)  to  the  Tunnel  line.  What  will  it  cost  to  put  these  two 
roads  on  a  par  in  this  respect  ? 

But  first,  let  us  see  what  Mr.  Brooks  figures  out  as  the  saving 
on  freight  by  his  road  over  the  Western.  He  claims  that  the 
whole  through  freight  from  the  West  to  Boston,  eight  years 
hence,  will  be  448,101  tons,  say  448,000  tons.  The  average 
price  per  ton  received  for  through  freight  last  year  by  the  West¬ 
ern  road  was  14.88.  At  this  rate  the  gross  receipts  for  448,000 
tons  would  be  $2,186,240.  Mr.  Brooks  claims  that  his  road 
can  carry  freight  five  per  cent,  cheaper  than  the  Western. 
This  would  amount  to  $109,812.  Assuming  that  the  Tunnel 
will  cost  ten  millions,  we  have  a  saving  of  a  fraction  over  one 
per  cent,  on  the  cost  of  his  road.  And  for  this  insignificant 
item  Mr.  Brooks  would  commit  the  State  to  an  expenditure  of 
ten  millions  of  dollars. 

But  the  additional  cost  of  carrying  this  freight  over  the  West¬ 
ern  road  will  fall  far  short  of  this.  It  reduces  itself  simply  to 
the  cost  of  auxiliary  power  to  haul  the  freight  up  the  five  miles 
of  maximum  grade.  Throughout  the  rest  of  its  entire  line  the 
Western  road  is  in  every  respect  equal,  and,  as  to  curves,  supe¬ 
rior  to  the  Tunnel  line.  What,  then,  will  be  the 

Annual  Cost  of  Auxiliary  Power 
for  these  five  miles  ? 

I  submitted  this  problem  to  a  friend  who  is  an  accomplished 
engineer,  who  replied  as  follows  : — 

“  The  problem  given  by  you,  if  I  understand  it  aright,  was  to  deter¬ 
mine  the  cost  of  an  assistant  engine  on  five  miles  of  75  feet  grade,  and 
the  number  of  tons  that  could  be  passed,  allowing  thirty  minutes  between 
trains.  The  cost  of  a  first  class  engine,  with  engineer,  fireman,  fuel,  and 
repairs,  was  formerly  covered  by  about  $20  per  day.  Owing  to  the 
large  increase  in  all  expenses  we  will  call  it  $40.  100  miles  per  day  at 

an  average  of  10  miles  per  hour  is  a  full  day’s  work  for  a  freight  engine. 
If  trains  run  day  and  night  there  will  be  48  trains  in  the  24  hours  with 
30  minutes  intervals.  One  engine  can  make  ten  round  trips  over  the 


57 


grade  ;  48  trips  will  require  five  engines  on  road,  and  a  reserve  of  two 
engines  in  shop, — in  all  seven.  Cost  per  day  of  engines  $5X40=$200. 
An  engine  weighing  thirty  tons  will  haul  fourteen  cars,  weighing  seven 
tons  each,  with  a  load  of  ten  tons  on  a  grade  of  75  feet  to  the  mile. 

“  If  on  other  parts  of  the  line  the  maximum  grade  eastward  be  assumed 
at  50  feet,  an  engine  can  haul  on  this  grade  twenty  cars,  and,  aided  by 
the  assistant  engine  on  the  steep  grade,  twenty  cars  to  a  train,  would 
measure  the  capacity  of  the  road.  48  trains  in  24  hours,  200  tons  to  a 
train,  300  days  to  a  year,  would  give  a  capacity  for  eastward  freights 
uniformly  distributed,  and  all  the  cars  fully  loaded,  of  2,880,000  tons  ; 
but  this  regularity  of  movement  is  unattainable  ;  it  may  be  calculated, 
however,  that  the  capacity  would  not  be  less  than  1,500,000  tons. 

“The  cost  of  the  assistant  engines  would  be  $200X300= $60,000 
allowing  for  interest  on  cost  of  reserve  engines,  extra  wear  of  track,  &c., 
$20,000  ;  total,  $80,000  to  cover  all  contingencies.  This  is  equivalent 
to  5^  cents  per  ton ;  or  one  cent  per  ton  per  mile  on  the  steep  grade 
will  cover  the  cost  of  assistant  power,  and  add  50  per  cent,  to  the  capacity 
of  the  road. 

“  To  get  a  clear  idea  of  the  advantage  of  this  arrangement,  suppose  that 
the  working  division  of  the  road  on  which  the  high  grade  occurs  is  fifty 
miles,  that,  without  the  assistant  engine  the  load  over  the  whole  division 
would  be  fourteen  cars,  with  the  assistant  engine  twenty  cars.  500,000 
tons  would  then  be  carried  over  the  fifty  miles  for  very  little  more  than 
the  cost  of  the  extra  power  on  the  five  miles  ;  say  $100,000  would  cover 
it,  which  is  only  four  mills  per  ton  per  mile  as  the  whole  cost  of  the  last 
500,000  tons.”  [Appendix,  D.] 

If  any  proposition  can  be  demonstrated,  I  think  I  have 
demonstrated  that  there  is  no  inferiority  in  the  Western  road, 
as  compared  with  the  Tunnel  line,  which  justified  the  State  in 
assuming,  or  which  now  justifies  it  in  completing  the  Tunnel . 
I  cannot  close  this  topic  better  than  by  copying  the  following 
extracts  from  an  article  by  “  Civil  Engineer  :  ” — 

“  But  it  is  objected  that  our  present  railroad  facilities  are  inadequate 
to  the  wants  of  the  community.  Then  let  them  he  increased.  You  do 
not  help  the  matter  by  opening  another  route,  no  better  than  the  exist¬ 
ing  one,  and,  if  finished,  equally  wanting  in  facilities.  For  it  is  not 
roadway  that  is  needed ,  it  is  cars  and  motive  power.  And  if  the  Tunnel 
route  were  finished  to-day,  who  will  furnish  these?  Neither  the  Fitch¬ 
burg  nor  the  Vermont  and  Massachusetts  roads  are  any  better  equipped 
than  the  Western,  for  so  immense  a  traffic  as  is  anticipated,  and  there  is 
no  guarantee,  in  fact  there  is  not  the  least  probability,  that  they  could  or 
8 


58 


would  increase  their  equipment,  while  the  State  stood  between  them  and 
the  West.  So  that,  after  all  is  done,  the  State,  owning  the  Tunnel  and 
the  Troy  and  Greenfield  road,  must  invest  another  million  or  two  for 
the  benefit  of  these  roads.  Better  do  it  now  for  the  Boston  and  Albany ; 
this  would  be  a  good  investment,  for  the  Western  road  would  gladly  pay 
for  the  use  of  the  cars  at  a  rate  which  would  quickly  reimburse  the 
State  both  principal  and  interest.  And  this  result  would  be  reached  in 
one  year  instead  of  ten,  and  at  a  cost  of  one  million  of  dollars  instead  of 
ten  or  more. 

“  In  a  few  weeks  the  bridge  at  Albany  will  be  finished,  and  Boston  will 
have  as  good  a  railroad  connection  with  the  New  York  Central  Railroad 
as  she  can  desire.  The  Baltimore  and  Ohio  Railroad,  with  its  maximum 
grade  of  116  feet  to  the  mile,  is  the  one  sufficient  avenue  to  Baltimore 
from  the  West,  and  the  Pennsylvania  railroad,  with  its  maximum  grade 
of  95  feet  to  the  mile,  is  the  only  direct  connection  that  Philadelphia 
has  with  the  West,  and  both  are  contented  ;  but  Boston,  with  a  better 
road  than  either,  and  which  has  never  yet  been  taxed  to  one-sixth  of 
its  capacity,  not  satisfied  with  one,  must  waste  her  energies  in  attempting 
to  construct  a  second.” 

Time  of  Completing  the  Tunnel. 

Mr.  Brooks  estimated  eight  years  from  his  commencement. 
He  has  been  at  work  “  vigorously  ”  for  two  years,  with  the 
State  treasury  at  his  command.  What  has  he  done  ?  We 
give  Mr.  Brooks’  statement  of  progress  made.  In  his  report 
for  1864,  he  says, — 

“East  End  of  the  Tunnel. 

“  The  work  here  has  thus  far  been  confined  to  bringing  the  bottom  of 
the  old  cutting  down  to  a  regular  grade,  and  such  side  cutting  as  was 
necessary  to  make  room  for  the  drain  in  the  centre  of  the  tunnel.  The 
extreme  depth  of  cutting  has  been  about  five  and  a  half  feet.  This 
work  has  been  completed  as  far  as  the  breast  of  the  old  cut,  work  upon 
which  has  lately  been  commenced.” 

At  the  West  shaft  no  progress  had  been  made  at  this  time. 
In  his  report  for  1865,  he  says, — 

“  East  End. 

“  On  the  first  of  December,  1864,  the  work  of  cutting  down  the  bottom 
to  bring  it  to  an  even  grade  had  been  completed  to  the  12  feet  breast  of 
the  old  cut,  and  the  work  of  reducing  this  had  just  commenced,  reaching 
at  that  date  a  point  2,145.9  feet  from  the  portal.  On  the  15th  of  March 


59 


last,  this  breast  had  been  removed,  and  a  heading,  15  feet  wide  and  6 
feet  high,  commenced,  2,399  feet  from  the  portal.  The  heading  on  the 
first  of  December  was  2,904  feet  from  the  portal.” 


Of  the  west  shaft  he  says,  “  the  heading  is  15  feet  wide  and 
6  feet  high,”  and  “  has  reached  a  point  414t4q-  feet  from  the 
shaft,  averaging  for  the  six  months  ending  December  1st,  41 
feet  per  month.”  Forty  feet  of  this  heading  was  done  by  Mr. 
Haupt.  From  these  data  we  get  the  actual  progress.  Oil 
March  15tli,  he  commenced  at  the  east  end  2,399  feet  from 
the  portal.  On  the  first  of  December  he  had  reached  2,904 
feet,  showing  an  advance  of  505  feet,  averaging  59T7T  feet  per 
month.  These  give  an  aggregate  advance  of  lOO^y  feet  per 
month.  Mr.  Haupt  advanced  at  east  end  2,399  feet ;  at  west 
shaft,  40  feet ;  total,  2,439  feet.  Mr.  Brooks  has  advanced  at 
east  end  505  feet;  at  east  face  of  west  shaft,  375  feet;  and  at 
west  face, 265  feet ;  total,  1,145  feet;  say  880  feet.  The  whole 
length  of  the  tunnel  is  24,586  feet.  We  have  then  the  follow¬ 
ing  table : — 


Total  length  of  Tunnel, 
Done  by  Mr.  Haupt, 
Done  by  Mr.  Brooks,  . 
Total  to  December  1,  . 

Remaining  to  be  done,  . 


.  24,586  feet. 
.  2,439  feet. 

.  1,145  “ 

-  3,584  feet. 


.  21,002  feet. 


Remember  that  the  rate  of  progress  for  the  last  six  months 
has  been  much  larger  than  it  has  been  or  can  hereafter  be  for 
an  entire  year,  for  it  embraced  the  best  portions  of  the  year  for 
work.  But  allowing  Mr.  Brooks  the  full  benefit  of  this  aver¬ 
age,  that  is,  100  feet  per  month,  and  it  will  take  him  two  hun¬ 
dred  and  twelve  months,  or  seventeen  years  and  eight  months 
to  complete  the  tunnel ! 

But  he  is  going  to  do  great  things  after  he  reaches  grade 
with  the  central  shaft.  Let  us  see.  The  shaft  is  to  be  1,050 
feet  deep.  On  December  1st,  he  had  sunk  it  220,  at  an  aver¬ 
age  of  18T6^  feet  per  month,  the  last  six  months  (the  best  season 
of  the  year  and  the  driest  ever  known.)  He  has  now  830  feet 
to  go  to  grade.  At  an  average  of  18-^  feet  per  month,  this 
will  take  him  44  months.  At  the  end  of  this  time  he  will  open 
two  new  faces.  In  these  44  months  he  will  have  advanced 


60 


4,400  feet  at  the  present  working  faces.  Deducting  this  amount 
from  21,002  feet,  which  was  the  whole  amount  to  be  done  last 
December,  and  there  will  remain,  at  the  end  of  44  months, 
16,002  feet  to  be  bored.  We  will  suppose  that  he  can  advance 
each  of  his  headings  at  the  central  shaft  35  feet  per  month, 
(and  this  will  be  much  more  difficult  at  a  depth  of  1,050  feet 
than  his  present  advance  of  41  feet  at  the  west  shaft,  which  is 
325  feet  deep.)  This  gives  him  70  feet  per  month  at  the  cen¬ 
tral  shaft.  He  will  then  make  the  following  monthly  progress  : 


At  east  end,  . 
west  shaft, 

central  shaft,  two  faces, 


.  59  feet. 
.  41  “ 

.  70  “ 


Total  per  month, 


170  feet. 


At  this  rate,  the  16,602  feet  remaining  to  be  done  when  the 
central  shaft  shall  be  finished,  will  require  99  months.  Adding 
this  to  the  44  months  during  which  he  will  have  worked  at  two 
faces, t  and  we  have  a  total  for  completing  the  tunnel,  by  work 
upon  all  four  faces,  133  months,  or  11  years  from  December, 
1865  !  And  this  assumes  that  every  month  of  that  eleven  years 
will  give  as  good  progress  as  the  best  six  months  of  last  year. 
It  allows  nothing  for  “  hidden  difficulties.”  It  includes  nothing 
for  the  2,300  feet  of  demoralized  rock.  During  this  period,  at 
least,  the  immense  traffic  of  the  West  must  wait! 

But  this  is  not  all.  The  size  of  the  tunnel,  when  completed 
as  recommended  by  Mr.  Brooks,  is  to  be  22  feet  wide  at  the 
bottom,  24  feet  wide  at  the  widest  part,  and  21  feet  high  above 
the  track,  giving  a  sectional  area  of  433  square  feet,  or  16 
cubic  yards  per  linear  foot.  Mr.  Brooks,  in  his  first  report, 
argues  that  Mr.  Haupt  was  all  wrong  in  not  commencing  the 
tunnel  of  its  full  size,  and  he  comes  to  the  conclusion  that  the 
suggestion  that  “  a  small  tunnel  be  first  built  and  then 
enlarged,”  is  “  entirely  out  of  the  question  in  this  case.”  Of 
course,  he  intended  then  to  commence  and  carry  through  a 
tunnel  of  full  size.  Mr.  Doane,  in  his  last  report,  gives  the 
actual  figures  of  the  comparative  cost  of  the  work  of  men  on 
small  sections  and  on  larger  ones,  showing  that  the  larger  the 
section,  the  smaller,  relatively,  the  cost.  And  yet,  will  it  be 


61 


believed  that  Mr.  Brooks  commenced  and  is  carrying  on  the 
tunnel  with  a  smaller  section  than  Mr.  Haupt’s  ?  He  is  working 
his  heading  6x15  feet,  giving  an  area  of  90  square  feet,  (Mr. 
Haupt’s  smallest  area  was  more  than  double  this,)  or  3J  cubic 
yards  per  linear  foot.  The  whole  advance  made  by  Mr.  Brooks 
(besides  finishing  Mr.  Haupt’s  work,)  has  been  1,145  feet.  At 
3|-  cubic  yards  per  foot,  he  has  removed  3,817  cubic  yards  of 
rock,  equal  to  239  feet  of  full  sized  tunnel.  Two  years  work ! 
Again,  when  Mr.  Brooks  commenced,  he  had  22,147  feet  of 
tunnel  to  bore.  At  16  cubic  yards  to  a  foot  of  completed 
tunnel,  this  would  require  the  excavation  of  354,352  cubic 
yards  of  rock.  He  has  excavated  3,817  cubic  yards  ;  this  is 
the  one  ninety-third  part  of  the  whole !  or  1.07  per  cent. 

Again,  Mr.  Brooks  has  received  from  the  State,  as  follows: 
(not  including  1175,000  paid  for  services  and  materials,  under 
the  Act  of  1862 :) 


Gash  from  State  Treasurer,  to  December,  1864,  $450,000  00 
Cash  from  State  Treasurer  from  December,  ’64 

to  December,  ’65, .  505,000  00 

Commissioners’  salaries,  two  years,  .  .  .  12,000  00 

Total  receipts  from  the  State,  .  .  .  $967,000  00 

Deduct  cash  on  hand  Dec.  1,  1865,  $12,491  00 
Deduct  value  of  supplies,  &c.,  on  hand 

and  not  sold  to  the  men,  .  .  35,447  00 

-  47,938  00 


Expended  in  work,  dam,  &c.,  Ac.,  .  .  .  $919,062  00 


He  has  removed  3,817  cubic  yards  of  rock  at  the  headings, 
and  about  2,000  atthe  central  shaft  and,  say  1,000  in  finishing 
Mr.  Haupt’s  work ;  total,  6,817  cubic  yards,  at  a  cost  of  $135 
per  cubic  yard !  ;  or  ^including  all  the  above  items  of  excava¬ 
tion,  he  has  removed  rock  equal  to  426  feet  of  completed 
tunnel  at  a  cost  of  $2,157  per  linear  foot !  The  old  price  for 
ordinary  rock  excavations  was  one  dollar  per  cubic  yard  ;  for 
rock  tunnelling,  say  three  dollars  ;  present  price,  double  that, 
six  dollars  per  cubic  yard.  Mr.  Brooks  has  made  it  cost  the 
State  $135  per  cubic  yard.  Mr.  Haupt  received,  for  a  tunnel 
with  a  sectional  area  of  252  square  feet,  a  little  more  than  half 


62 


the  size  of  Mr.  Brooks’  area,  $30  per  linear  foot ;  Mr.  Brooks’ 
tunnel  cost  the  State,  $2,157  per  linear  foot. 

But  we  shall  be  told  that  a  large  portion  of  Mr.  Brooks’ 
expenditures  has  been  for  the  dam,  machinery,  &c.,  and  that 
this  will  now  cease.  Who  can  be  sure  of  that  ?  With  the 
exception  of  the  dam, — and  it  is  hardly  credible  that  Mr. 
Brooks  can  repeat  that  folly;  and  yet  I  do  not  know  what 
guaranty  we  can  have  that  the  man  who  could  commit  one 
such  blunder  will  not  commit  another  equally  stupendous : — 
with  this  exception,  the  history  of  the  past  affords  no  assurance 
that  the  expenditures  hereafter  for  machinery  will  not  be 
equally  large.  I  have  not  referred  to  his  performances  at 
Tunnel  Brook,  which  have  been  absolutely  puerile.  He  is 
spending  I  don’t  know  how  many  thousands  of  dollars  on 
pneumatic  drills  whose  success  is  just  as  problematical  as 
were  the  experiments  for  the  last  two  years  from  which,  he 
predicted  the  most  brilliant  results.  All  his  schemes  for 
ventilation  have  hitherto  resulted  in  furnishing  barely  enough 
air  for  eight  or  ten  men  to  breathe.  How  these  contrivances 
will  work  when  he  gets  four  times  as  far  into  the  mountain  as 
he  now  is,  operating  the  drills  by  machines  which  will  require  a 
much  larger  number  of  lamps,  (two  of  which  consume  as  much 
air  as  one  man,)  and  of  workmen,  nobody  can  tell.  The  engi¬ 
neering  science  of  Europe  has  failed  at  Mont  Cenis :  Will  Mr. 
Brooks’  admirers  guarantee  his  success?  (Appendix,  B.) 

I  cannot  dwell  on  these  topics.  This  we  know :  Not  the 
slightest  reliance  can  be  placed  on  Mr.  Brooks’  estimates. 
Every  step  of  progress  has  cost  five,  ten,  twenty  times  as  much 
as  he  estimated.  What  has  been  will  be. 

What  is  to  be  Done? 

Wiser  heads  than  mine  must  answer  this  question.  My  own 
judgment  leads  to  but  one  conclusion:  abandon  the  work, 
pocket  the  loss,  and  let  the  resources  of  the  State  be  henceforth 
applied  to  legitimate  functions.  Various  suggestions  have 
been  made.  One  is,  to  let  out  the  work  to  private  parties, 
who,  with  additional  aid  from  the  State  if  need  be,  would 
complete  it.  Another  is,  that  the  railroad  companies  to  be 
benefited  by  the  opening  of  this  route  should  be  helped  to 
finish  it.  Either  of  them,  objectionable  as  they  are,  would  be 


63 


infinitely  preferable  to  going  on  under  the  present  system. 
Still  another  suggestion  is, — and  I  understand  gentlemen  have 
been  investigating  this, — to  carry  the  road  over  the  mountain. 
I  am  informed  that  this  examination  shows  that  such  a  road  can 
be  built  for  a  tithe  of  what  the  tunnel  will  cost,  with  engineering 
characteristics  entirely  fitting  it  for  a  great  commercial  road. 
I  throw  out  these  hints  for  what  they  are  worth.  Of  this  only 
am  I  sure :  no  change  can  be  for  the  worse. 

One  duty,  it  seems  to  me,  is  imperative.  There  should  be 
an  investigation  which  shall  settle  the  question  whether  it  is 
the  policy  of  the  State  to  go  on.  The  suspension  of  the  work 
for  a  year,  for  this  purpose,  is  of  no  account,  compared  with 
the  importance  of  an  investigation  of  such  a  character  as  to 
command  the  confidence  of  the  people  of  the  State.  There 
has  been  no  such  investigation,  and  the  public  opinion  of  the 
State  is  perplexed.  The  commission  should  have  on  it  one 
able  man  who  fully  represents  the  friends  of  the  tunnel,  another 
who  fully  represents  the  opponents  of  the  tunnel.  Each  of 
these  men  would  enter,  con  amove ,  into  the  work  of  bringing 
out  all  the  facts  and  arguments  in  favor  of  his  side,  and  of 
criticizing  the  views  of  his  opponent.  “  Impartial  ”  men  will 
not  and  cannot  do  this  as  thoroughly  as  partisans  will.  The 
third  man  should  be  the  ablest  that  can  be  found  in  the  wide 
world ,  and  as  “  impartial  ”  as  human  nature  will  allow. 

Another  point,  I  think,  is  equally  settled.  The  system  must 
be  changed,  and  also  the  head-manager.  First,  the  system  is 
wrong.  The  shrewd,  intelligent  capitalists  of  the  world,  after 
an  experience  of  a  generation  in  building  railroads,  have  come 
to  this  conclusion:  that  the  true  system,  for  efficiency  and 
economy,  is  to  place  the  construction  of  railroads  in  the  charge 
of  an  advisory  board,  with  an  executive  head,  either  from 
their  own  number  or  from  the  outside.  This  system  secures 
wisdom  of  counsel  and  executive  efficiency.  The  State,  disre¬ 
garding  these  conclusions  of  business  men,  has  entrusted  this 
gigantic  work  to  one  man,  and  has  failed. 

My  own  construction  of  the  Acts  of  1862  and  1863  was,  that 
the  intention  of  the  legislature  was  to  make  the  executive 
council  such  an  advisory  board.  Unfortunately,  disastrously, 
another  interpretation  of  those  Acts  prevailed,  and  Mr.  Brooks 
was  left  dictator. 


64 


Even  if  the  present  system  is  to  continue,  I  think  all  will 
agree  that  the  managing  head  must,  be  changed.  At  least,  if 
the  advisory,  organizing,  and  executive  capacities  are  to  be 
united  in  one  man,  he  should  devote  his  whole  time  and 
capacities  to  the  State.  Mr.  Brooks  can  give  to  this  task  only 
the  fragments  of  time  and  ability,  which  belong,  primarily  and 
entirely  to  other  enterprises.  Again,  conceding  to  Mr.  Brooks 
large  executive  ability,  he  has  shown  himself  utterly  deficient  in 
organizing1  powers.  Hence,  although  reasonably  successful  in 
details, — and  for  this  success  he  is  largely  indebted  to  the 
resident  engineer  and  his  assistants, — Mr.  Brooks  has  lamenta¬ 
bly  failed  in  planning  and  organizing  the  enterprise.  He  is 
not  an  educated  engineer;  he  has  had  no  practical  experience 
in  works  of  this  kind ;  and,  to  sum  it  all  up  in  one  word, 
nature  did  not  endow  him  with  the  organizing  capacity.  The 
disadvantages  attending  the  prosecution  of  works  of  this  kind 
by  the  State  are  large  enough,  even  when  they  are  prosecuted  in 
accordance  with  the  long-settled  rules  of  individual  action.  If 
these  are  still  to  be  set  at  naught,  the  future  can  bring  forth  only 
a  repetition  and  aggravation  of  past  failures. 

In  this  discussion  I  have  omitted  entirely  one  most  important 
topic — tile  mischievous  influence  of  public  works  upon  the  poli¬ 
tical  morality  of  a  State.  I  cannot  here  enter  this  field,  inviting 
as  it  is.  May  a  Merciful  Heaven  save  old  Massachusetts  from 
the  demoralizing  influences  which  have  so  debauched  the  politics 
of  Pennsylvania  and  New  York !  (Appendix,  C.) 

My  appeal  is  founded  on  material  considerations.  I  trust  it 
will  not  be  deemed  improper  for  me  to  implore  the  legislature  to 
sound  this  wretched  business  to  the  bottom.  There  is  a  large 
class  of  men  living  on  the  tunnel  line,  who  go  first,  last  and 
always  for  any  management,  wise  or  foolish,  which  looks  to  the 
completion  of  the  work.  They  stood  by  Mr.  Haupt,  until  they 
saw  a  shorter  cut  to  their  end,  when  they  remorselessly  deserted 
him.  They  stand  by  Mr.  Brooks  in  mismanagement  infinitely 
more  disastrous,  and  they  will  desert  him  too,  when  they  find 
he  can  no  longer  serve  them.  Well  knowing  the  abuses  that 
now  prevail,  they  close  their  eyes  and  forbear  to  look,  and  they 
will  resolutely  discountenance  investigation.  They  reason  that 
every  additional  dollar  spent  in  connection  with  the  enterprise, 
increases  the  guarantee  that  it  will  be  completed.  The  interests 


65 


of  the  State  do  not  come  within  their  range  of  vision.  But  the 
responsible  guardians  of  the  interests  and  good  name  of  the 
State  act  from  higher  motives.  They  are  relied  upon  to  inquire 
diligently  whether  “  these  things  be  so.”  Of  one  thing  they 
may,  I  think,  be  certain,  that  if  the  wisdom  and  courage  of  the 
general  court  shall  prove  unequal  to  the  occasion,  and  the 
tunnel  is  left  to  go  on  under  Mr.  Brooks  at  an  expense  so  many 
times  greater  than  the  cost  of  the  same  work  under  his  prede¬ 
cessor,  the  prayer  will  soon  come  up  from  an  abused  people, 

0//,  for  one  year  of  Herman  Haupt ! 


9 


66 


APPENDIX. 


[A.] 

I  had  intended  to  have  made  a  record  of  the  ex  parte  proceedings  of 
the  executive  council  of  1861 ;  but  I  have  mislaid  the  documents, 
which  it  cost  a  good  deal  of  pains  to  hunt  up.  Perhaps  it  is  as  well. 
The  pillory  in  which  it  would  have  placed  those  seven  gentlemen,  (Hon. 
Jacob  Sleeper  did  not  join  them,)  would  have  been  anything  but  com¬ 
fortable.  It  was  a  disorganizing  and  discreditable  conspiracy  to  usurp 
the  prerogatives  of  the  governor  and  dictate  his  official  duties.  The  day 
will  come,  if  it  has  not  already  come,  when  most  of  those  gentlemen 
will  desire  that  the  whole  record  might  be  expunged. 


[B.] 

The  following  from  the  London  “  Mining  Journal,”  shows  that  blun¬ 
ders  are  committed  abroad  as  well  as  here,  and  suggests  the  possibility 
of  the  failure  of  Mr.  Brooks’  contrivances  for  ventilation  : — 

“  In  a  communication  from  Pico  Mulera,  Italy,  dated  January  4,  Mr. 
H.  Hoskings,  whose  name  is  well  known  to  the  readers  of  the  London 
Mining  Journal,  writes, — ‘The  mortality  amongst  the  workmen  em¬ 
ployed  in  the  Mount  Cenis  Tunnel  is  so  great,  in  consequence  of  powder 
smoke  and  bad  ventilation,  that  they  have  refused  to  work  any  more. 
The  work  is  now  at  a  standstill ;  ’  and  the  statement  is  especially  inter¬ 
esting,  from  the  precise  manner  in  which  it  confirms  the  opinion 
expressed  in  the  Mining  Journal  of  January  2,  1864,  by  our  esteemed 
correspondent,  Mr.  Nicholas  Ennor,  in  the  account  of  his  visit  to  the 
tunnel.  He  then  stated, — ‘  I  next  turn  to  the  air  department.  .  The 
moment  I  came  to  the  tunnel  I  looked  to  its  mouth ;  to  my  surprise  I 
could  not  discover  the  least  sign  of  smoke  or  gas  emerging  from  it, 
which  instantly  convinced  me  that  something  was  wrong.  I  had  not 
entered  the  tunnel  two  hundred  yards  before  I  met  a  still,  dense  smoke  ; 
it  soon  become  so  dense  that  I  could  not  see  a  lamp  on  the  opposite 


67 


side,  which,  of  course,  was  only  twenty-six  feet  distant.  The  horses 
and  wagons  passed,  but  I  could  not  see  them.  This  continued  up  to 
within  one  hundred  yards  of  the  end,  when  a  light  could  be  seen  for 
twenty  yards.  Here  air  was  liberated  sufficient  to  support  the  men 
with  the  machine ;  but  as  it  passed  back,  where  the  side  men  were  at 
work,  it  was  all  devoured  by  the  men  and  lamps. 

“I  was  in  about  an  hour,  and  when  I  came  out  I  spit  as  black  as 
though  I  had  dined  on  lampblack ;  so  did  the  gentleman  that  accom¬ 
panied  me.  I  think  I  have  had  over  fifty-five  years’  actual  mine  prac¬ 
tice,  and  I  have  come  to  the  conclusion  that  this  work  will  never  be 
accomplished  without  other  means  than  the  present  be  adopted.  I  am 
satisfied  that  there  is  nothing  deserving  or  eulogizing  to  the  French  or 
Italian  engineering  for  what  is  doing  to  carry  out  this  undertaking,  not¬ 
withstanding  that  they  have  an  abundance  of  water-power  at  command, 
and  machinery  that,  I  should  judge  from  a  momentary  glance,  cost 
£40,000.’  ” 

Mr.  Brooks  beats  them  “  all  hollow.”  His  machinery  has  already 
cost  $500,000,  not  including  the  drills  now  being  made  at  Fitchburg, 
air-compressors,  &c.,  &c. 


[C.] 

It  would  be  instructive  to  show  how  mischievously  the  tunnel  has 
interfered  in  the  politics  of  the  State,  especially  as  illustrated  in  its  con¬ 
trol  of  state,  senatorial  and  councillor  conventions,  legislative  caucusses, 
&c.  But  these  topics  open  too  wide  a  field.  One  instance  must  suffice. 

My  own  attention  was  first  directed  to  the  disturbing  agency  of  this 
selfish  and  malignant  element  by  the  election  of  1861.  In  the  summer 
of  that  year,  the  controversy  arose  between  Governor  Andrew  and  Mr. 
Haupt,  which  resulted  in  the  suspension  of  the  work.  The  following 
tables  of  the  votes  of  the  tunnel  towns  proper  in  1860  and  1861,  will 
show  perfectly  that  the  people  of  that  region  considered  the  tunnel  ques¬ 
tion  paramount  to  all  political  issues.  It  will  be  seen  that  these  towns, 
which  in  1860  gave  a  vote  of  nearly  five  to  one  for  Andrew  over  Beach, 
in  1861  gave  an  actual  majority  to  Mr.  Davis.  So  debauched  had  this 
section  become,  that  if  the  State  had  followed  their  lead,  the  State 
administration  would  have  been  delivered  over  to  the  enemy,  and  the 
glorious  war  record  of  old  Massachusetts  would  have  been  lost  forever. 

I  give  the  votes  also  for  lieutenant-governor  in  1861,  to  show  that 
the  hostility  was  to  Governor  Andrew* 


68 


Governor,  1860. 

Governor  and  Lieut.  Gov.,  1861. 

Andrew. 

i  Beacli. 

Andrew. 

Davis. 

Nesmith. 

Bailey. 

Franklin  County. 
Buckland, . 

178 

68 

10 

138 

133 

28 

Charlemont,  .... 

157 

1 

21 

3 

84 

1 

Colrain,  ..... 

214 

61 

86 

89 

97 

91 

Deerfield,  ..... 

335 

120 

140 

111 

156 

111 

Erving, . 

63 

19 

36 

20 

47 

11 

Greenfield, . 

321 

114 

196 

144 

266 

106 

Hawley, . 

118 

3 

- 

64 

81 

- 

Heath, . 

87 

- 

37 

18 

64 

10 

Leyden, . 

Monroe,  .  .  .  .  . 

75 

15 

41 

18 

41 

18 

30 

3 

17 

18 

38 

2 

Montague, . 

206 

28 

125 

17 

150 

17 

Orange, . 

202 

79 

129 

89 

133 

87 

Rowe, . 

75 

3 

4 

23 

58 

_ 

Shelburne, . 

256 

31 

39 

111 

134 

25 

Wendell,  .  .  .  .  .  j 

77 

26 

64 

38 

67 

35 

Berkshire  County. 
Clarksburg, 

57 

13 

3 

18 

8 

16 

Florida, 

70 

9 

3 

55 

58 

8 

Savoy, . 

91 

41 

54 

37 

48 

37 

Totals, . ! 

2,612 

634 

1,005 

1,011 

1,663 

605 

[D.] 

Mr.  Brooks  estimates  the  total  amount  of  through  freight  from  the 
West,  to  Boston,  eight  years  hence,  at  448,000  tons.  The  calculation 
on  pages  56  and  57  shows  that  1,500,000  tons  can  be  carried  annually, 
at  a  cost,  for  auxiliary  power,  up  the  high  grade,  of  $100,000.  For  a 
materially  smaller  amount,  the  cost  would  decrease  in  the  same  propor¬ 
tion.  I  am  informed,  by  my  friend  who  made  the  calculation  in  the 
text,  that  500,000  tons  could  be  carried  annually,  at  a  cost,  for  auxiliary 
power,  up  this  high  grade,  of  $50,000.  This  sum,  then,  is  the  entire 
saving  which  the  tunnel  would  make,  if  completed  eight  years  hence, 
even  if  the  entire  freight  from  the  West  passed  over  that  line.  Fifty 
thousand  dollars,  then,  annually,  which  is  the  interest  of  $1,000,000  at 
five  per  cent.,  is  the  sum  total  of  the  exigency  for  the  tunnel,  for 
through  freight.  But  Mr.  Brooks  claims  only  one-third  of  this  freight 
for  his  line,  so  that  the  saving  is  reduced  to  one-third  of  $50,000,  or 


69 


$16,GG7  annually,  and  this,  from  Mr.  Brooks’  own  figures,  is  absolutely 
the  whole  exigency,  so  far  as  the  great  grievance  of  the  incapacity  of 
the  Western  Railroad  is  concerned,  for  the  expenditure  by  the  State  of 
ten  millions  of  dollars,  for  another  great  commercial  avenue  to  the 
West. 


ADDENDUM. 


THE  DEERFIELD  DAM. 

To  illustrate  the  extravagant  outlay  for  this  dam,  I  have  taken  some 
pains  to  ascertain  the  cost  of  the  Holyoke  dam.  This  dam  crosses  the 
Connecticut  River;  is  1,017  feet  long,  SO  feet  high,  and  cost  about 
$115,000.  I  have  been  unable  to  get  the  exact  figures,  but  I  am 
informed  on  the  best  authority,  that  the  cost  was  within  that  sum.  It 
has  stood  over  sixteen  years,  and  has  at  times  delivered  a  volume  of 
water  twelve  and  a  half  feet  deep  over  its  entire  length.  Mr.  Brooks’ 
dam  is  250  feet  long,  20  feet  high,  and  the  largest  volume  of  water  ever 
delivered  over  it  has  been  thirty-three  inches.  The  cost,  when  com¬ 
pleted,  including  canal,  will  be  $275,000.  The  volume  of  water  deliv¬ 
ered  over  the  Holyoke  dam  is  nineteen  times  greater  than  the  largest 
ever  delivered  over  the  Deerfield  dam. 

If  a  dam  was  to  be  built  at  all  at  the  tunnel,  it  should  have  been  built 
lower  down,  at  the  point  where  the  power  is  to  be  applied, — thus  saving 
the  great  cost  of  rock  excavation  for  canal,  waste-way,  &c.  A  dam 
could  have  been  built  there,  upon  the  same  plan  as  the  Holyoke,  which 
would  have  been  perfectly  safe  for  twenty  years,  at  an  outside  cost  of 
$25,000. 


/ 
/ 


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fli/ 


